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DE-RIGGING ELECTIONS:  
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF 
REDISTRICTING REFORM  
MICHAEL S. KANG∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After California Republicans and Democrats agreed in 2001 on a 
“sweetheart” bipartisan gerrymander that ensured virtually no 
congressional or state legislative seats would change hands, a Republican 
consultant boasted that the “new [redistricting] plan basically does away 
with the need for elections.”1 Such is the state of self-dealing in 
redistricting conducted by incumbent elected officials. As one North 
Carolina state senator admitted, when it comes to redistricting, “We are in 
the business of rigging elections.”2  
Alarmed critics naturally see redistricting today as polluted by a 
corrosive excess of politics.3 They look to apolitical institutions as 
possible sources of restraint on gerrymandering—namely courts and 
independent commissions. In the fall 2005 elections, reformers in 
California and Ohio proposed ballot initiatives to strip control of 
redistricting from state legislatures and entrust redistricting to independent 
commissions. Redistricting reform appeared to suffer a pair of devastating 
defeats when voters rejected both initiatives.4 But these highly publicized 
election setbacks were not the end of redistricting reform—far from it. 
 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. Sincere thanks to Bobby Ahdieh, Bill 
Buzbee, Julie Cho, Beth Garrett, Heather Gerken, Rick Hasen, Ben Norris, Rick Pildes, Mike Pitts, 
Robert Schapiro, and Liam Schwartz for their comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Naeha Dixit, 
Matt Gewolb, and Shelley Thomas for their terrific research assistance.  
 1. John Wildermuth, Lawmakers Use Creative License in Redistricting: Oddly Shaped 
Congressional Maps Would Largely Benefit Incumbents, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at A6 (quoting 
Tony Quinn). Indeed, every congressional incumbent who ran for re-election in California won by a 
landslide in 2002, and not a single congressional or state legislative seat, out of 153 districts, changed 
partisan control in 2004. See Nancy Vogel, Looking to Design a Fairer Map, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2005, at B1.  
 2. John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., 
Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting Mark McDaniel).  
 3. Samuel Issacharoff goes so far as to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court should strike down as 
unconstitutional per se any redistricting conducted by elected officials. Samuel Issacharoff, 
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 641–45 (2002). 
 4. See, e.g., Stuart Rothenberg, On Redistricting, Voters Have Spoken Up for the Status Quo, 
ROLL CALL, Nov. 10, 2005 (“Voters simply don’t care enough about the process of drawing legislative 
and Congressional districts.”).  
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They were merely opening volleys in the long and continuing battle over 
redistricting to come. Advocates of redistricting reform recovered and 
mobilized aggressively on multiple fronts, driven by the conviction that, in 
Heather Gerken’s words, “we cannot leave the regulation of politics to 
politics.”5  
Delegation of redistricting to apolitical institutions, such as courts and 
independent commissions, comes with heavy costs. Insulation helps 
ensure that redistricting is not driven by political self-interest, but it also 
ensures that redistricting is far removed from the necessary degree of 
public engagement, scrutiny, and accountability. Indeed, courts and 
independent commissions, at least those commissions proposed by current 
reforms, are specifically designed as an institutional matter to be 
politically inaccessible. In understandable zeal to root out political self-
dealing in redistricting, reformers would eradicate from redistricting the 
positive values of the political process as well.  
Rather than trying to stamp out politics, redistricting reform must seek 
a new and healthier framework in which redistricting can be conducted as 
part of an open political process incorporating the important elements of 
democratic decisionmaking. Ironically, the problem with redistricting 
today is not that it is too political, but instead that it is not political enough. 
Redistricting is insufficiently “political” in the sense that it occurs too 
isolated from public engagement, too distant from public scrutiny, and too 
insulated from popular accountability.  
This Article challenges the understandable impulse to retreat from the 
political process in reforming redistricting. By so arguing, I reveal 
profound weaknesses in current reform proposals and demonstrate the 
need for a sharp readjustment in the direction of redistricting reform. What 
all the anger about gerrymandering overlooks is the forgotten value of the 
political process. Redistricting implicates central normative questions of 
governance and representation that govern how a democracy should 
operate. These are complicated questions that require democratic input and 
civic debate on what are fundamentally contestable value judgments that a 
democracy must make democratically.  
I propose direct democracy as the best solution, a distinctly political 
solution, to the problems of contemporary gerrymandering. By requiring 
direct democratic approval by the general electorate for passage of any 
statewide redistricting plan, direct democracy invites the public into civic 
 
 
 5. Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating Electoral 
Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 39 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).  
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engagement about the fundamental issues of democratic governance that a 
democracy ought to embrace. As I will explain, direct democracy can be 
designed to induce the major parties to forsake the maximization of 
political advantage and to compete instead for the median voter’s 
approval. Direct democracy thus encourages healthy moderation in 
redistricting by forcing the public to decide directly for itself and by 
institutionalizing political oversight of the redistricting process. Within the 
contest of a direct democratic election, the public must decide these central 
issues, and there is special value in having it do so. Direct democracy lies 
at the heart of reviving a viable, healthy new process—a vibrant political 
process—for redistricting state legislatures and the U.S. Congress.  
Direct democracy offers a viable third way, between skeptics who 
would leave redistricting completely to the legislature despite the costs, 
and reformers who would sequester redistricting completely from the 
political process. This Article acknowledges the need for redistricting 
reform but reorients reform toward proper recognition of legitimate 
decisionmaking through a political process. This reorientation is badly 
needed as reform efforts continue to advance. On the legal front, the U.S. 
Supreme Court last term decided League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry,6 its third partisan-gerrymandering case in two years.7 
The Court’s decision left the law of partisan gerrymandering essentially 
unchanged and open to continued petitioning by advocates of judicially 
imposed limitations. On the political front, activists in California and Ohio 
regrouped immediately after their 2005 election setbacks and are 
developing new reform proposals. Reformers promise continued efforts 
there and similar ballot measures in several other states.  
In Part II, I briefly describe redistricting reform efforts to transfer 
greater responsibility for redistricting to apolitical institutions, namely 
courts and independent commissions.8 In Part III, I argue that these efforts 
to insulate redistricting from politics are badly misguided.9 I contend that 
redistricting, as a fundamental political matter, requires popular 
participation and a process of democratic debate and compromise to strike 
the basic value tradeoffs tied up in redistricting. I conclude that 
redistricting reform is needed but requires a middle path between skeptics 
of reform and the shape of current reform efforts. In Part IV, I propose 
 
 
 6. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 7. The others are Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), and Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 
(2004). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
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new use of direct democracy as the viable third way for redistricting 
reform.10 I describe how a basic requirement of direct democratic approval 
for redistricting legislation would moderate partisan gerrymandering, 
induce the major parties to compete for public approval, and draw the 
public into a healthier political process.  
II. CURRENT REFORM APPROACHES AND THE SEARCH FOR  
APOLITICAL SOLUTIONS 
Current redistricting reform approaches propose shifting greater 
responsibility for redistricting to politically neutral institutions: (1) courts 
and (2) independent commissions. In this Part, I describe these efforts and 
argue that the push for political neutrality in redistricting is misguided.  
A. Courts and Partisan Gerrymandering 
The first approach to redistricting reform is to seek judicial limitation 
of political gerrymandering. Many hope that courts will limit how far 
elected officials can exploit the redistricting process for political 
advantage.11 Courts are asked to decide, in Justice Scalia’s words, “How 
much political motivation and effect is too much?”12 Beyond some 
judicially determined limit, courts would intervene and overturn a 
legislative redistricting plan. Courts could serve as neutral referees that 
might permit politicians to redistrict with political considerations in mind, 
but they would block redistricting proposals that press too far, that simply 
push gerrymandering beyond reasonable limits. The U.S. Supreme Court 
revisited political gerrymandering recently in LULAC v. Perry, but at least 
temporarily turned away from the prospect of more vigorous judicial 
intervention against partisan gerrymandering.13  
Leading up to LULAC v. Perry, the Court had not responded in a 
meaningful fashion to calls for judicially imposed limits on 
gerrymandering. The Court declared in Davis v. Bandemer that a 
constitutional claim for partisan gerrymandering was justiciable.14 
 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See, e.g., Linda P. Campbell, Congress, Voters, Justices and Lines in the Sand, DALLAS 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 15, 2005, at B13; Editorial, Supreme Court Hearing on Texas Redistricting 
Will Provide a Barometer to Measure Partisanship on the High Court, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2005, 
at B8; Editorial, Redistricting Tom DeLay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at A34. 
 12. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 297. 
 13. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 14. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/4
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However, a plurality of the Court announced what proved to be an 
impossibly difficult standard for establishing an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander under Bandemer. Justice White’s plurality opinion insisted 
that partisan gerrymandering was unconstitutional only when the 
plaintiff’s party had “essentially been shut out of the political process.”15 
The Court itself found that the gerrymander in Bandemer did not meet this 
standard, and lower courts applying Bandemer interpreted it to provide no 
check on gerrymandering in practice.16 No redistricting scheme had been 
struck down under the Bandemer standard in almost twenty years.17  
Two years ago in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court again disappointed 
reformers by leaving Bandemer effectively in place.18 Only four Justices, 
led by Justice Scalia, voted to declare gerrymandering claims under 
Bandemer nonjusticiable per se.19 Despite the ultimate judgment in Vieth 
to uphold the challenged congressional redistricting of Pennsylvania, a 
five-Justice majority actually affirmed the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering as a constitutional claim.20 However, the majority voting 
to uphold the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims divided over 
what legal standard should be applied to adjudicate such claims. Justice 
Kennedy’s controlling opinion, as the narrowest opinion in the majority, 
concluded that no currently proposed standard, including Bandemer’s and 
the tests proposed in the dissents, appeared judicially manageable.21 
Nonetheless, Vieth raised hopes for stronger judicial intervention in the 
future because Justice Kennedy insisted that the fact “no such standard has 
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in 
the future.”22 In other words, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court left 
 
 
 15. Id. at 139; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Bandemer’s Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal 
Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).  
 16. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Davis plurality required a 
demonstration of such pervasive devaluation over such a period of time as to raise real doubt that a 
case could ever be made out.”).  
 17. A district court struck down a districting map for superior court judgeships in North Carolina 
in 1996 under Bandemer, but the ruling was promptly reversed by the Fourth Circuit after Republican 
candidates, the gerrymandered plaintiffs below, won every contested seat in elections held just five 
days after the district court’s decision. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 
1996) (per curiam) (unpublished decision).  
 18. 541 U.S. 267; see also Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone 
from Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367 (2005).  
 19. 541 U.S. at 305–06.  
 20. Id. at 309–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 21. Id. at 311–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 22. Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy argued that further study 
or advances in computer technology may “facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens 
[of partisan gerrymandering], with judicial intervention limited by the derived standards.” Id. at 313 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). State constitutional requirements regarding redistricting may 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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open opportunities for, and indeed encouraged, lower courts to experiment 
with new approaches to gerrymandering that the Court might entertain 
soon.  
In LULAC v. Perry, however, the Court again failed to reach agreement 
on a new standard for judging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. 
Only two years after Vieth, LULAC v. Perry consolidated appeals for four 
lawsuits challenging on different grounds the Texas mid-decade 
congressional redistricting in 2003.23 Texas Republicans, having won 
control of the Texas legislature the year before, decided to redraw the 
state’s congressional districts even though a valid redistricting plan was 
already in place following the 2000 Census and no new redistricting was 
required by law.24 Democrats argued that the 2003 redistricting was 
motivated solely by partisan purposes and brought multiple challenges 
alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering under Bandemer. They 
also alleged, among other things, a novel claim that Texas could not 
redistrict mid-decade, based on outdated Census data, purely for partisan 
advantage.25 As in Vieth, a majority of the Court voted to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims and upheld the redistricting at 
bar under the Equal Protection Clause.26 A majority of the Court continued 
to agree that partisan gerrymandering remained justiciable and failed again 
to agree upon a “workable test for judging partisan gerrymanders.”27 Just 
as in Vieth, the Court appeared to have changed the law of partisan 
gerrymandering almost not at all.  
In LULAC v. Perry, Justice Kennedy again authored the controlling 
opinion. Justice Kennedy joined in judgment with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in dismissing the plaintiffs’ 
partisan gerrymandering claims. While leaving settled the issue of 
justiciability from Vieth, Justice Kennedy explained that the plaintiffs 
 
 
provide a clearer basis for judicial intervention. See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for 
Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 648–50 (2004).  
 23. The three-judge district court initially rejected every claim. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam). After its initial decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court for further proceedings in light of the Court’s decision in Vieth, Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 
941 (2004); Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004); 
Lee v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004); Am. GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004), the district 
court simply reinstated its earlier rejection of the partisan gerrymandering claims on remand. See 
Henderson v. Perry, 399 F.2d 756 (E.D. Tex. 2005). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on 
March 1, 2006. 
 24. See Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 443 (2005) (describing events leading to the 2003 redistricting). 
 25. See LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).  
 26. Id. at 2612. 
 27. Id. at 2611. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/4
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were required in a partisan gerrymandering case to “offer the Court a 
manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a 
partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”28 Regardless whether a 
redistricting was motivated in part or solely by partisanship,29 a successful 
gerrymandering claim must demonstrate that the political effect of the 
redistricting would violate a reliable standard “for deciding how much 
partisan dominance is too much.”30 Justice Kennedy rejected a symmetry 
standard for measuring partisan bias proposed by amici31 and concluded 
that the LULAC plaintiffs failed otherwise to provide a workable test for 
finding the 2003 redistricting unconstitutional. He affirmed dismissal of 
their claims for failure to state a claim.32 
What is more, the Court rejected the novel claim that the mid-decade 
Texas redistricting was unconstitutional under the one person, one vote 
rule.33 Just two months after it decided Vieth, the Court had taken a 
measured step to rein in gerrymandering in Cox v. Larios.34 In that case, 
the plaintiffs failed to establish their partisan gerrymandering claim, but 
they successfully argued that the redistricting of the Georgia legislature 
violated the one person, one vote requirement of interdistrict 
equipopulousness under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court 
concluded that the population deviation from the one person, one vote rule 
in the Georgia reapportionment resulted impermissibly from “the 
systematic favoring of Democratic incumbents and the corresponding 
attempts to eliminate as many Republicans as possible.”35 In a summary 
affirmance, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s rejection of 
partisan considerations as a government justification for deviation from 
the one person, one vote rule.36 The Court thus signaled support for 
indirect judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering through one 
 
 
 28. Id. at 2607. 
 29. In any event, Justice Kennedy elided the state’s admission that the 2003 redistricting 
occurred for solely partisan purposes by noting that “partisan aims did not guide every line [the 
legislature] drew.” Id. at 2609. 
 30. Id. at 2611. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2612. 
 34. 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 35. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2004). These motivations did not 
constitute “legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy” that would 
justify deviation from the constitutional standard of equal population from district to district. Id. 
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)).  
 36. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
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person, one vote challenges.37 The LULAC plaintiffs argued that the 
discretionary mid-decade redistricting could not constitute a requisite 
good-faith attempt to comply with the one person, one vote rule because 
the redistricting was based on outdated and then-inaccurate Census 
population data. However, two Justices, at most, were willing to give any 
weight to these one person, one vote claims in LULAC v. Perry.38  
The Court’s general reluctance to restrict partisan gerrymandering 
appeared motivated by a lack of judicial confidence. Judicial restriction of 
gerrymandering would draw courts, which are putatively nonpartisan and 
apolitical institutions,39 into the untenable position of managing what is 
fundamentally a political exercise. Justice Kennedy emphasized the 
difficulty for courts of “acting without a legislature’s expertise” and the 
unwelcome task of removing from the democratic process “one of the 
most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in 
republican self-governance.”40 Indeed, challenges to gerrymanders 
demand more of courts than simply striking down excessively partisan 
plans.  
Today, judicial intervention against gerrymandering almost necessarily 
brings with it active judicial management of the redistricting process. A 
court that strikes down a redistricting plan, for whatever reason,41 
invariably is drawn into authorship of a new redistricting plan to replace it, 
or a close interaction with legislators working to formulate a new plan (or 
both).42 Courts “become active players often placed in the uncomfortable 
role of determining winners and losers in redistricting, and, therefore, 
elections.”43 When courts have involved themselves in redistricting 
matters, namely in racial gerrymandering and one person, one vote cases, 
 
 
 37. Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan describe this indirect intervention as a “second-order 
judicial review of political gerrymanders.” Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw 
the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 567 (2004). Justice 
Stevens’s concurring opinion in Larios emphasized that a second-order regulation of gerrymandering 
is made more urgent by the Court’s inability to agree upon a standard for partisan gerrymandering in 
Vieth. Larios, 542 U.S. at 950–51 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 38. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 39. Obviously, courts might be characterized in practice as partisan and political institutions, 
even if they do not intend to act as such. See generally Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial 
Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005).  
 40. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 41. Judicial management of legislative redistricting often arises after successful challenges to 
redistricting plans under the one person, one vote doctrine and the Voting Rights Act, among other 
claims. See generally Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn 
Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131 (2005).  
 42. See id.  
 43. Id. at 1131.  
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the courts have drawn heavy criticism.44 Even so, Justice Stevens 
predicted that “the present ‘failure of judicial will’ will be replaced by 
stern condemnation of partisan gerrymandering.”45 Greater judicial 
direction of the redistricting process is a price that Justice Stevens and 
reformers seem happy to pay. They are more than willing to trade the costs 
of judicial entanglement for the perceived benefits of judicial oversight in 
redistricting. I further discuss the costs of this approach in Part III. 
B. Independent Commissions 
The second reform approach to attacking partisan gerrymandering is a 
call for independent commissions.46 Thirteen states appoint commissions 
with some redistricting capacity, whether for congressional or state 
redistricting.47 Seven of the thirteen states entrust primary authority for 
both congressional and state redistricting to their commissions;48 the other 
six give commissions authority over only state redistricting and only in an 
advisory capacity.49 In all but one of these states, the commissions are 
staffed by either political appointees or elected officials with familiar 
partisan affiliations.50 Only one state today—Iowa—delegates redistricting 
 
 
 44. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: 
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588 (1993); Richard Briffault, 
Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993); 
Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its 
Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted 
Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001); Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority 
Representation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1589 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: 
Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996).  
 45. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 951 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., Gregory L. Giroux, For Redistricting Control, the Future Is Now, CONG. Q. WKLY., 
Sept. 19, 2005, at 2470; Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform, NAT’L VOTER, June 2005, at 5–6; see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1693–94 (1993) (discussing the proposed use of blue-ribbon or bipartisan 
commissions).  
 47. See Developments in the Law—Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1169 n.27 
(2006) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting 
Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 843–44 (1997); Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election 
Administration, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2314, 2320 & nn.37–39. 
 48. These states are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 47, at 1169 n.30.  
 49. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 47, at 1169 n.31; Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-
Judge Panel: An Evaluation of California’s Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
165, 189 (2005).  
 50. For example, elected officials choose or serve as members of the commission in six of seven 
states that place responsibility for both congressional and state redistricting in a commission. See 
Developments in the Law, supra note 47, at 1169. 
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authority almost exclusively to an independent, nonpartisan agency. In 
Iowa, the Legislative Services Agency (LSA) develops district maps for 
the state’s legislature and congressional delegation,51 consistent with 
neutral principles of contiguity, unity of political subdivisions, 
compactness, and equal population.52 Iowa law explicitly prohibits the 
LSA from considering incumbency, partisanship, and political advantage 
in its work.53  
Reformers increasingly view the establishment of independent 
commissions, similar to Iowa’s LSA that would redistrict on the basis of 
neutral principles rather than political ones, as the solution to today’s 
problems of political gerrymandering. Reformers generally claim that 
these redistricting commissions produce plans that are fairer and more 
competitive than plans crafted entirely through the normal legislative 
process.54 However, where independent commissions have been 
established, they actually have been less successful than promised.55 The 
commission in Arizona, established in 2000, produced a plan that has been 
beset by legal challenges and provided only a marginal gain in 
competitiveness.56 Iowa is an exceptional case, with an unusually 
homogenous population, balanced partisanship, and uniform geography 
that should make it easier for the LSA to redistrict on the basis of 
contiguity and compactness, while also complying with voting rights law 
and producing partisan competitiveness.57 However, even in Iowa under 
the LSA, ninety-eight percent of U.S. House incumbents have won re-
election.58 Every U.S. House incumbent was re-elected in 2004 with an 
average margin of eighteen percent.59  
 
 
 51. See Iowa Code Ann. § 42.6 (West Supp. 2005).  
 52. See Iowa Code Ann. § 42.4 (West Supp. 2005).  
 53. See id. The director of the LSA, however, is appointed by a bipartisan legislative council. See 
Iowa Code Ann. §§ 2.41–2.42 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005). The Iowa legislature maintains a right to 
reject the LSA’s redistricting proposals, but it has never done so. See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting 
Reform: What Is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND 
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 92, 102 (Bruce E. Cain & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2005).  
 54. But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 
(2001) (concluding that if redistricting by the legislature is “100 percent political,” redistricting by 
bipartisan commission is “98 percent political”).  
 55. See Mann, supra note 53, at 103–08; Developments in the Law, supra note 47, at 1169–70. 
 56. See Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 284 F. 
Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Ariz. 2003); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Mann, supra note 53, at 106–07; Developments in the 
Law, supra note 47, at 1170. 
 57. See Mann, supra note 53, at 102.  
 58. See Developments in the Law, supra note 47, at 1170. 
 59. See id.  
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Nonetheless, reform measures to establish redistricting commissions 
appeared on the ballot for the 2005 fall elections in California and Ohio.60 
Both measures called for the removal of redistricting authority from the 
state legislatures and the creation of independent redistricting bodies to 
draft new redistricting plans for the states legislatures and congressional 
delegations.  
Of the two ballot measures, Proposition 77 in California, sponsored by 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, received more national publicity. It 
called for the California legislature to appoint an independent three-
member panel to draft redistricting plans for California’s congressional 
and state legislative districts.61 The three-member panel would have been 
selected from a pool of retired California judges who had not previously 
held political office.62 Proposition 77 left considerable discretion to the 
three-member panel to redistrict as it saw fit. Proposition 77 instructed the 
panel only to redistrict in accordance with constitutional and Voting 
Rights Act requirements, to conform to county and city boundaries to the 
“greatest extent practicable,” and to refrain from considering any effect on 
“incumbents and political parties.”63 The panel would have been required 
to decide unanimously upon a redistricting plan that would immediately 
go into legal effect for the subsequent statewide election cycle.64 In the 
same election during which the commission’s redistricting map would be 
used, California voters would vote separately on whether to ratify the 
commission’s map for use in future elections.65 If the voters of California 
rejected the new plan, the panel would be required to recommence the 
entire process of drawing another redistricting plan as a replacement, 
subject again to a statewide vote.66  
Issue 4 in Ohio also proposed the creation of an independent 
commission to draft Ohio’s congressional and state legislative districts.67 
The five-member commission would have included two senior state 
 
 
 60. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, 
PROPOSITION 77 (2005 SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/ 
story?section=elections&id=3454379 [hereinafter “Proposition 77”]; OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, FULL 
TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, STATE ISSUE 4 (NOV. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sos.state. 
oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/results2005.aspx?section=1042 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) [hereinafter 
“Issue 4”]; see also Nancy Vogel, Several States May Revisit Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2005, at B1.  
 61. Proposition 77, supra note 60, § 2; see generally Mosich, supra note 49.  
 62. Proposition 77, supra note 60, § 2.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Issue 4, supra note 60. 
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judges, one from each major party, who would have in turn selected the 
other three members of the commission, none of whom could have served 
in elected office during the previous ten years.68 In contrast to Proposition 
77, however, Issue 4 charged the commission with the overriding priority 
of “maximiz[ing] the number of competitive districts in Ohio.”69 Issue 4 
defined a mathematical formula for calculating intradistrict electoral 
competitiveness.70 Issue 4 then directed the commission to solicit 
redistricting plans from the public and select the plan with the highest 
competitiveness score, irrespective of almost all other considerations.71 
Unlike Proposition 77, Issue 4 did not provide for popular ratification or 
for judicial review by state courts.72 In short, both Proposition 77 and 
Issue 4 proposed independent commissions that would have assumed 
redistricting duties in place of the legislature, but Issue 4 placed far less 
discretion in the hands of the Ohio redistricting commission than 
Proposition 77 placed in the hands of the California panel.  
Both Proposition 77 and Issue 4, however, were rejected by statewide 
votes in the November 2005 elections. Only forty-one percent of 
California voters voted in favor of Proposition 77.73 Issue 4 was even less 
successful with Ohio voters, winning only thirty percent of the vote.74 
Voters sniffed out partisan motivations underlying the push for reform.75 
Among other things, the ballot measures called for mid-decade 
redistricting that might have upset the partisan composition of the state 
legislatures. These provisions left the measures vulnerable to allegations 
that Proposition 77 and Issue 4 were partisan politics disguised as 
 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE ISSUE 4–EXPLANATION AND ARGUMENT FOR (NOV. 8, 2005), 
available at www.sos.state.oh.us/ElectionsVoter/results2005.aspx?Section=1062; see also Issue 4, 
supra note 60. 
 70. See Issue 4, supra note 60. 
 71. Id. Issue 4 did make a minimal allowance for the commission to consider adjustments to a 
plan to preserve communities of interests, provided that any adjustment did not affect electoral 
competitiveness by designated margins. Id. 
 72. See Joe Hallett, Schwarzenegger Wants Ohio’s Issue 4 to Pass, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 
6, 2005, at 4A (quoting John McClelland, Republican spokesperson, as arguing that “[t]he 
fundamental difference between the redistricting proposal in California and Issue 4 in Ohio is that 
voters in California have the final say over the districts”).  
 73. Juliet Eilperin, You Can’t Have a Great Election Without Any Races, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 
2005, at B03. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Two Setbacks in Fair Districting, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Nov. 13, 2005; Sam Hirsch 
& Thomas E. Mann, Op-ed, For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, 
§ A, at 23.  
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redistricting reform, which undercut their bases of public support.76 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s flagging popularity during the course of 2005 
damaged Proposition 77’s prospects, as many voters voted against 
Proposition 77 and several other ballot measures in disapproval of 
Schwarzenegger.77 
More importantly, the fall campaigns raised concerns about how well 
the independent commissions would account for the diverse political 
interests in each state. For instance, in California, Proposition 77 invested 
all responsibility for redistricting in a three-member panel of retired 
judges. It provided no institutional assurances of transparency or popular 
input into redistricting decisions. Indeed, the operative premise of 
Proposition 77 was the panel’s insulation from political influences. The 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) 
argued that political insulation was a major failing of the independent 
commission, because it “cannot be held accountable for [its] actions.”78 A 
consortium including the League of Women Voters, the Asian Pacific 
American Legal Center, and MALDEF called for “redistricting reform that 
implements an open, transparent redistricting process” rather than 
“creat[ing] more barriers to public participation.”79  
Critics of Proposition 77 argued that a three-member panel of retired 
judges could not reflect the diversity of California’s citizenry or properly 
account for the diverse interests with a great deal at stake in redistricting. 
The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 
(NALEO) argued prominently that the independent commission mandated 
by Proposition 77 would likely fail to incorporate public input and fail to 
understand the political dynamics of the Latino community.80 Asian-
American groups opposed Proposition 77, arguing that “Proposition 77 is 
a misguided attempt at reform that will make a bad process even worse.”81 
 
 
 76. See, e.g., Hirsch & Mann, supra note 75; District Drawing Still Ripe for Reform, THE 
ADVERTISER-TRIB. (Tiffin, Ohio), Nov. 27, 2005; Two Setbacks in Fair Districting, supra note 75.  
 77. See generally Mosich, supra note 49 (citing polling results). 
 78. Press Release, Mexican Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Leading Civil Rights Groups 
Denounce Proposition 77 (Sept. 7, 2005), http://www.maldef.org/news/press.cfm?ID=276.  
 79. Id.  
 80. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, NALEO Opposes 
Proposition 77’s Proposed Unrepresentative and Flawed Redistricting Process (Oct. 17, 2005), 
http://releases.usnewswire.com/printing.asp?id=55137; cf. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting 
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 851–52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (addressing similar 
complaints about the Arizona redistricting commission).  
 81. Steve Lawrence, Minority Communities Fear They Will Lose Political Clout, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, available at http://www.ncvaonline.org/archive/reporter110105.shtml# 
MINORITY_COMMUNITIES_FEAR_THEY_WILL_LOSE_POLITICAL_CLOUT (quoting Eugene 
Lee, attorney with the Asian Pacific American Legal Center).  
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Critics claimed that “Proposition 77 unwisely entrusts the task of drawing 
legislative boundaries for 36 million Californians with three retired judges 
who cannot reflect the racial/ethnic and gender diversity in this state.”82 
California voters took cues from these trusted groups and voted down 
Proposition 77.  
Issue 4 raised related concerns about the Ohio independent 
commission. As in California, some reform critics argued that the political 
insulation of independent commissions was a critical failing. A spokesman 
for Ohio First, the main opposition group against Issue 4, argued that 
“[g]overnment is improved by accountability to voters, not to bureaucrats 
appointed to boards.”83 However, Issue 4’s strict directive that the 
commission mechanically apply its competitiveness formula and choose 
the most competitive plan made the commission’s composition and 
political insulation less salient.84 Issue 4 ensured that the Ohio commission 
would have almost no discretion in redistricting decisions, as it was legally 
bound to choose the most competitive plan by formula.  
As a result, opponents attacked Issue 4’s failure to permit any 
consideration of other relevant political considerations in redistricting. 
Although opponents of Issue 4 acknowledged the need for redistricting 
reform, they campaigned against Issue 4’s formulaic focus on 
competitiveness as the sole criterion for redistricting.85 Ohio House 
Speaker Jon Husted argued that Issue 4 was “too rigid” as a result and 
“d[id]n’t allow for any human judgment.”86 To illustrate the point, Ohio 
First publicly displayed maps featuring bizarrely shaped congressional 
districts, criss-crossing the entire state.87 Ohio First alleged that Issue 4’s 
strict prioritization of competitiveness and failure to allow consideration of 
 
 
 82. Id. John Trasvina, a MALDEF official, explained that the commissioners would need a crash 
course in geography and diversity to really understand communities of interest. Californians don’t 
necessarily follow geographic lines.” Id.  
 83. Joe Hallett, State Issues Stir Both Sides of Aisle, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2005, at 
News 01A (quoting David Hopcraft); see also Jean Schmidt, Editorial, Why Ohio Voters Should Run 
from RON, PEOPLE’S DEFENDER (West Union, Ohio), Nov. 3, 2005 (arguing that Issue 4 offers “no 
oversight by voters, elected officials, or the state legislature”). 
 84. One Ohio newspaper editorialized that, as a consequence, “[i]t wouldn’t matter if Dopey, 
Sneezy, Daffy, Goofy and Bugs were on [the commission].” Editorial, Issues: Yes on 2, No on 3, 4, 5, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2005, at 10B.  
 85. See Jim Siegel, Joe Hallett & Mark Niquette, GOP Asks for Help Drawing Districts, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2005, at 1E; Mark D. Tucker, Does Ohio Need Issue 4?, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2005, at 13A.  
 86. Sandy Theis, Opposition Gracious After Election Reforms Fail, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Nov. 10, 2005, at B1 (quoting Republican Ohio House Speaker Jon Husted).  
 87. See Editorial, supra note 84; Hallett, supra note 83; Martin Gottlieb, Issue 4 Is the One That 
Counts, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16, 2005, at B8.  
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geographic compactness or political subdivision lines would ensure 
enactment of crazy-quilt redistricting schemes with little sensibility 
beyond competitiveness.88 A number of prominent Ohio Democrats 
publicly opposed Issue 4,89 and even advocates criticized it as “poorly 
drafted” and “unworkable.”90 Compared to Californians, Ohio voters were 
never convinced of the need for redistricting reform, but Issue 4’s 
weaknesses helped convince them to defeat it overwhelmingly on election 
day.91  
Direct democracy provided redistricting reform with a public hearing 
that otherwise might have been impossible through the legislature. 
Moreover, voters did not simply vote reflexively for reform, which polls 
showed the public supported as a general matter.92 Voters seemed to 
discern politics at work and rejected the ballot measures as exactly the 
type of partisan politicking that reform was supposed to dampen. 
However, the public debate over the ballot measures revealed important 
deficiencies in the reform trend toward independent commissions and 
court intervention. The public displayed serious reservations about 
deferring to independent institutions on matters of redistricting. In both 
California and Ohio, the public was uncomfortable with taking politics 
completely out of redistricting, at least when doing so meant putting too 
much confidence in politically inaccessible commissions.93 In California, 
concerns centered on the unrepresentativeness of the commission’s 
probable composition. In Ohio, concerns centered on the narrow 
mechanical focus on electoral competitiveness to the exclusion of all other 
considerations. In both states, as a result, voters were troubled by the 
 
 
 88. Hallett, supra note 83. 
 89. See, e.g., Julie Carr Smyth & Reginald Fields, Not Everyone Wants to Reform Ohio, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 2005, at B1; Some Democrats Don’t Want Changes, AKRON 
BEACON J., Nov. 7, 2005.  
 90. Joe Hallett, Much-Needed Redistricting Reform Isn’t in the Cards for Ohio, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2005, at 5B; see also Hallett, supra note 72 (quoting Arnold Schwarzenegger 
endorsing Issue 4, despite its defects, because “perfection shouldn’t be the enemy of good”).  
 91. See Jon Craig, Poll: Most of Us Know Zilch About Issues 1-5, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 
27, 2005, at 1C. 
 92. See Michael S. Kang, Counting on Initiatives?: An Empirical Assessment, 4 ELECTION L.J. 
217, 219 (2005) (reviewing JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004); and DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. 
TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004)) (distinguishing between public support 
for general propositions and specific policy).  
 93. Even advocates harbored concern about Issue 4’s focus on electoral competitiveness as the 
lone redistricting criterion. See Edward B. Foley, If Not Issue 4, Then What?, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 1, 2005, available at http://www.daytondailynews.com (search all dates for “if not issue 4”).  
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absence of an open political process that would balance the many relevant 
interests in redistricting.  
The defeat at the polls of both ballot measures did not slow the push for 
independent commissions for redistricting. Advocates of redistricting 
reform gathered petition signatures and lobbied for redistricting legislation 
in several states.94 Representative John Tanner introduced a bill in the U.S. 
House of Representatives mandating independent redistricting 
commissions throughout the fifty states.95 Even in Ohio and California, 
reformers are vowing to continue their work, while acknowledging 
mistakes and attempting to reach broader bipartisan support for 
redistricting by independent commission.96  
C. The Search for Apolitical Solutions 
The two popular reform approaches to political gerrymandering, 
described above, have a common and striking feature—they delegate 
authority over redistricting to putatively nonpartisan, apolitical 
institutions, either courts or independent commissions. Courts, especially 
federal courts, are nominally apolitical. Federal judges, for instance, are 
protected by life tenure and insulated from political punishment. Similarly, 
independent commissions would be designed to shield their deliberations 
from political influence and public pressures. Iowa’s LSA—nonpartisan, 
objective, and guided by technocratic expertise—is the popular model.  
The basic logic is straightforward. The premise is that the political 
motivations of self-interested elected officials, those in charge of 
redistricting, are the problem. The obvious risk is that these elected 
 
 
 94. See Joshua Brustein, Drawing the Line: Redistricting Reform, GOTHAM GAZETTE (New 
York), May 8, 2006; Editorial, Senate Must Draw Line on Partisanship, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 30, 
2006, at 10A; Giroux, supra note 46, at 2470; Steven Harmon, Redistricting Measure Back Before 
Law Makers, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 26, 2006, at A1; Stephen Majors, District Boundaries Spark 
Debate, BRADENTON HERALD, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1C, Local & State; Mann, supra note 46, at 4, 7; 
Vogel, supra note 60; see also Dave Williams, Georgia Considers Redistricting Reform, GWINNETT 
DAILY POST, Apr. 30, 2006, available at http://www.gwinettdailypost.com (search for “Georgia 
Considers”).  
 95. See Josephine Hearn, Tanner Redistricting Bill Gains Senate Sponsor, THE HILL (Wash., 
D.C.), Mar. 1, 2006, available at http://www.fairvote.org/index.php.?page=9&articlemode= 
showspecific&showarticle=1251.  
 96. See William Hershey, DeWine to Work on Proposals for Redistricting, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS, NOV. 10, 2005, at B1; Redistricting Reform May Yet Emerge from Legislature, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2006; Jim Siegel, Redistricting Reform, Round 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
May 5, 2006, at 01E; Jim Siegel, Speaker Returns to Redistricting Issue, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 
20, 2006, at D1; Lisa Vorderbrueggen, Legislators Reviving Boundary Proposals, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A1; Daniel Weintraub, Redistricting Reform Might Live to See Another Day, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29, 2005, at B7.  
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officials in state government will perform their redistricting duties with 
their personal and partisan self-interest foremost in mind.97 Self-dealing 
incumbents can and do substitute their political interests as the overriding 
priority for redistricting in place of any broader sense of the public good. 
A deep distrust of politicians’ involvement in their own redistricting is 
understandable. Although political scientists debate whether 
gerrymandering is responsible,98 incumbents win re-election to Congress 
and state legislatures with staggering regularity.99 Politics are the problem, 
under this account, allowing political actors to act in their self-interest 
rather than for the general welfare.  
Samuel Issacharoff, the foremost academic commentator in favor of 
insulating redistricting from politics, argues for the unconstitutionality per 
se of redistricting conducted by elected officials. He proposes that “the 
Court should forbid ex ante the participation of self-interested insiders in 
the redistricting process, instead of trying to police redistricting outcomes 
ex post.”100 All redistricting by elected officials should be struck down, 
regardless of the redistricting outcome, as a prophylactic measure against 
the risks of gerrymandering.101 For Issacharoff, and many others in 
agreement, there are no sufficient justifications for giving political insiders 
the opportunity to engage in self-interested redistricting.  
Reformers thus attempt to remove politics from redistricting by 
removing redistricting from politics. As Issacharoff recommends, 
redistricting “must be conducted at a safe distance from the immediate 
demands of the political process.”102 Reformers like Issacharoff are certain 
that neutral arbiters, such as courts and independent commissions, are 
more likely to reorient the redistricting process toward an objective sense 
of the public interest.103 Issacharoff argues that “[v]arious approaches to 
nonpartisan redistricting, such as blue-ribbon commissions, panels of 
retired judges, and Iowa’s computer-based models, recommend 
 
 
 97. See Kang, supra note 24. 
 98. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. 
Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1 ELECTION L.J. 315 (2002). 
Compare Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew Gunning, Don’t Blame Redistricting for 
Uncompetitive Elections, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 87 (2006), with Michael P. McDonald, Drawing the 
Line on District Competition, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 91 (2006).  
 99. See generally Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 98, at 319, fig. 1.  
 100. Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 643. 
 101. Id. at 642. 
 102. Issacharoff, supra note 47, at 1691. 
 103. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 500 (2004) (observing that 
“Issacharoff tries to remove direct incumbency and partisan concerns from the process as much as 
possible so that other more legitimate values may flourish”). 
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themselves as viable alternatives to the pro-incumbent status quo.”104 By 
turning to apolitical institutions, operating at a remove from political 
influence, reformers intend to root out political self-interest as a defining 
motivation for redistricting. By depoliticizing redistricting, reformers hope 
that redistricting reform delegates judgments to neutral decisionmakers 
insulated from political influence and motivation, liberated to carry out 
redistricting in the public interest.  
An initial objection, however, is that nominally apolitical institutions 
do not necessarily produce fairer outcomes.105 Political scientists Jonathan 
Katz and Gary Cox have shown empirically, for instance, a strong 
tendency by judges to decide redistricting cases in favor of the party that 
appointed them.106 Courts may not ultimately serve as trustworthy 
watchdogs over partisan gerrymandering. Redistricting commissions, 
depending on their composition, too often produce plans that entrench 
incumbents from both parties and raise Voting Rights Act concerns.107 
Scholars have discovered that even truly independent methods of 
redistricting may produce quite biased results.108  
More importantly, and more central to the Article, I argue that the 
removal of political self-interest from redistricting is only the first half of 
 
 
 104. Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 644.  
 105. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the 
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 180 (2003); Nathaniel Persily, 
Reply: In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002); see also Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 
1694–95 (suggesting that independent commissions may simply mask partisan motivations and 
effects). 
 106. See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 129 (2002) (finding that 
partisanship influenced judicial decisions about whether an invalid redistricting map could be used in a 
pending election); see also Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial 
Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995) (finding 
that federal judges appointed by one party were more likely to strike down redistricting conducted by 
the other party). 
 107. See JEREMY BUCHMAN, 3 DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS, LEGISLATURES, & 
REDISTRICTING 207–20 (2003); Mann, supra note 53, at 102; Developments in the Law, supra note 47, 
at 1168–70; see also D. J. Rossiter, R. J. Johnston & C. J. Pattie, The Partisan Impacts of Non-partisan 
Redistricting: Northern Ireland 1993–95, 23 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 455 (1998); 
cf. Kang, supra note 24 (noting the tension between “offensive” and “defensive” gerrymandering).  
 108. See, e.g., R. J. Johnson, Redistricting by Independent Commissions: A Perspective from 
Britain, 72 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 457 (1982); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan 
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 69–73 (1985) (describing systematically biased redistricting in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and New Zealand, despite the use of nonpartisan commissions); see also ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 88–89 (1990) (explaining how 
Robert Bork, a conservative Republican serving as special master, authored a redistricting of 
Connecticut that unintentionally but dramatically benefited Democrats).  
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the two-part challenge of redistricting reform. Discussion of partisan self-
interest in redistricting receives almost all the media attention in the 
political debate over redistricting reform, but the second half of the reform 
challenge is just as critical. If not political self-interest, reform must 
address what should replace political self-interest as a normative compass 
in redistricting. What are the normative goals that should affirmatively 
guide neutral redistricting? Reformers are clear that the political self-
interest of elected officials does not qualify, but identification of political 
self-interest as the enemy extends only so far. How do we decide what 
constitutes redistricting for the public interest?  
Reform must articulate, or develop a process for deciding, the political 
values that will replace self-interest as the guiding principles for 
redistricting going forward. If partisan gerrymandering “frustrates . . . the 
will of the People” in redistricting,109 then reform of gerrymandering must 
decide what actually represents the will of the people in redistricting. The 
task of redistricting necessarily requires decisionmakers to shape and 
structure politics actively toward their normative vision of how politics 
ought to operate. Once we have neutral, apolitical decisionmakers 
handling redistricting, how should they draw district lines? The answers 
are not obvious in any sense. Should electoral competition be paramount, 
as many suggest? Should partisan and group representation in the 
legislature be more important? Justice Frankfurter vexed in Baker v. Carr 
over the flood of important considerations to be weighed and balanced in 
redistricting—“geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic 
and social cohesions or divergences among particular local groups, 
communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby 
and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage . . . and a 
host of others.”110 Heather Gerken likewise sympathizes with the 
redistricter over difficult questions: “Are the preferences of rural voters 
and urban voters different, and should the Court recognize this fact? To 
what extent ought a majoritarian system recognize minority voices? How 
does one gauge the social meaning of an apportionment plan?”111  
 
 
 109. Robert A. Koch, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Gaffney and the Improper Role of Politics in 
the Districting Process, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 99, 113 (2005).  
 110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323–24 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 111. Gerken, supra note 44, at 1443. Even once democratic values are prioritized, implementation 
of democratic values is far from clear. Choosing among values, such as equality, is only the beginning 
of the theoretical work in many respects. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 133 (1981) 
(distinguishing 108 distinct theoretical conceptions of political equality); Jonathan W. Still, Political 
Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1981) (arguing that equality is indeterminate for 
practically specifying democratic government).  
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These questions are enormously complex and contentious. Academic 
commentators have proposed an array of putatively objective approaches 
to redistricting,112 some of which contradict one another outright and all of 
which conflict at the margin.113 Neither political neutrality nor impartial 
expertise alone provides clear answers. It is on this question—how a 
democratic polity can arrive at affirmative answers about how to redistrict 
representative institutions—that I next focus my attention.  
III. POLITICAL ANSWERS FOR POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
By seeking objective neutrality and abandoning political solutions to 
partisan gerrymandering, current reform efforts move in precisely the 
wrong direction—one that is fundamentally undemocratic and 
disrespectful to the public’s democratic prerogatives. Redistricting is an 
inherently political question that ultimately requires political answers.  
By “political,”114 I refer to the legislative character of an issue that 
offers no objectively correct answers, but only contestable ones based on 
judgments of policy and values. The types of decisions inherent in 
redistricting require tradeoffs among competing democratic principles, 
each important in its own right. Balancing important values such as 
representation, electoral competition, and responsiveness is a 
quintessentially political task which must be handled through public 
channels. 
A. Redistricting as a Political Question 
There is deep dissensus about the fundamental goals to be achieved in 
redistricting. The Supreme Court’s clearest mandate in the area of 
redistricting is close adherence to its one person, one vote rule.115 
Although equipopulous districting enjoys solid support, many critics have 
challenged it persuasively as derogating other important priorities, 
 
 
 112. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE, 52–80 (1984) (discussing “good 
government criteria” for redistricting); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 11–12 (listing a 
number of proposals). 
 113. See CAIN, supra note 112, at 68–77 (concluding that “good government” criteria for 
redistricting clash at the margin).  
 114. As explained above, I mean to say more than that redistricting has political consequences, 
which is obvious. Nor do I mean to invoke the jurisprudential doctrine of political questions. See 
generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine 
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).  
 115. The one person, one vote rule dictates a principle of equal population across districts for 
legislative apportionment. See generally Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One 
Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003).  
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including minority representation and preservation of political 
communities.116 James Gardner, for one, claims that the one person, one 
vote rule is deeply in tension with the preservation of established local 
communities, which itself should be the priority of redistricting.117 
California’s Proposition 77 reflects to a degree Gardner’s values in its 
dictate that “district boundaries shall conform to the geographic 
boundaries of a county, city, or city and county to the greatest extent 
possible.”118 But Proposition 77 came under political attack precisely for 
excessive attention to preserving pre-existing political subdivisions and 
inadequate attention to the interests of minority groups that do not 
necessarily coincide with political subdivisional lines.119  
From an entirely different direction, a growing number of 
commentators, including Richard Posner, Richard Pildes, and Samuel 
Issacharoff, argue forcefully that maximization of intradistrict electoral 
competition should be the priority in redistricting.120 Issue 4 in Ohio itself 
embodied this strategy in its command that the redistricting proposal with 
the score for highest competitiveness be enacted.121 Nonetheless, 
Nathaniel Persily responds that the protection of incumbents and 
proportional partisan representation in redistricting—in other words, 
reduction of intradistrict competition—might be more valuable.122 
Incumbents bring seniority, institutional memory, and technical expertise, 
while being known to their constituents and having represented their 
districts well.123 In fact, the Court has come closest to adopting Persily’s 
view and repeatedly has declared the legitimacy of protecting incumbents 
as a legitimate state objective of redistricting.124 In short, as Justice 
 
 
 116. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 137 (1994); Hayden, supra note 44. 
 117. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2002).  
 118. Proposition 77, supra note 60, § 2(f). 
 119. See infra Part II.B for discussion of Proposition 77.  
 120. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 649 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 
Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 102 
(2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Democratic Politics]; Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political 
Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1999). 
 121. Issue 4, supra note 60. 
 122. See Persily, supra note 105. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996); 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977); White 
v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795–97 (1973). In fact, in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973), 
the Court held that judicial scrutiny should be at its “lowest ebb” when a redistricting divides political 
power in proportion to the parties’ respective voting strength in the electorate, such that incumbents of 
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Frankfurter once complained, “[a]pportionment, by its character, is a 
subject of extraordinary complexity, . . . even after the fundamental 
theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative 
legislature have been fought out or compromised.”125 There is serious 
disagreement about the normative goals to be achieved through 
redistricting.  
Redistricting is therefore fundamentally different than election 
administration, for which neutral, nonpartisan control makes more sense. 
Following the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, a consensus among 
reformers and academic commentators increasingly favors nonpartisan 
election administration, as opposed to administration by an elected 
secretary of state.126 The reason is simple—there is relatively broad 
agreement on neutral ex ante principles for election administration.127 
Although there is nothing close to consensus on the core goals for 
redistricting, there is consensus about proper election administration; 
political impartiality in election administration is uncontroversial.128 There 
are no serious arguments, for instance, that government should administer 
elections purposefully toward favoring certain groups or interests, as it 
often does in redistricting. Richard Hasen, an advocate of nonpartisan 
election administration, concludes that “the fundamental principles of 
neutral election administration are not subject to serious debate.”129 
Political discretion in election administration is thus more harmful than 
helpful.  
By contrast, nonpartisan control over redistricting inevitably would 
confront “fundamental disagreements on goals to be achieved.”130 Choices 
in redistricting that cannot fall back on established normative consensus 
 
 
both parties are assigned to electorally safe legislative districts. The Court deemed the result as 
“politically fair,” because the redistricting sought “not to minimize or eliminate the political strength 
of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional 
representation in the legislative halls of the State.” Id. at 753–54. 
 125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323–24 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 126. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974, 988–91 (2005) 
(reporting that thirty-three states elect their chief election administrator, whether secretary of state or 
other title, by partisan election, while the remaining states select their administrators by political 
appointment).  
 127. I do not mean to say that there is never disagreement on matters of election administration, as 
the current controversies over voter-identification requirements demonstrate. See, e.g., Developments 
in the Law, supra note 46, at 1144–54 (discussing the partisan controversy over voter fraud). 
Nevertheless, the basic point is that there is far greater consensus on the core goals of proper election 
administration than of redistricting.  
 128. Hasen, supra note 126, at 988. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
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must be made on the basis of contested political values and require 
judgments that are distinctly political in character. For these matters, 
which are usually decided by political institutions through a political 
process, ultimate resolutions are often controversial and contestable. 
Reasonable, public-spirited people disagree sharply about the relative 
importance of different redistricting goals. They are without any value-free 
method for deciding which goals are objectively superior.131 The only way 
to prioritize certain redistricting criteria above others, when they inevitably 
conflict, is with reference to the relative value ascribed to the many 
democratic interests such as competition, representation, diversity, and 
minority voice, among others.  
In redistricting, there are thus only political answers contingent on 
value judgments that cannot be reduced manageably to objective logic or 
technocratic expertise. As Justice Breyer argues in his Vieth dissent, 
redistricting embodies a “series of compromises of principle—among the 
virtues of, for example, close representation of voter views, ease of 
identifying ‘government’ and ‘opposition’ parties, and stability in 
government.”132 Redistricting is not a policy matter that can be 
satisfactorily resolved by expert fiat or neutral adjudication. Indeed, expert 
scholars have proposed an incredible array of redistricting criteria without 
arriving at any consensus.133 No “‘neutral’ or ‘pre-political’ public interest 
criteria” exist.134 Redistricting ought not to be “politics free.”135  
 
 
 131. See CAIN, supra note 112, at 73–74; Pamela S. Karlan, Congressional Power to Extend 
Preclearance Under the Voting Rights Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y, June 2006, at 12, available 
at http://www.acslaw.org/node/2964 (click “Karlan Preclearance Paper 6-14-06.pdf” link) (“Part of the 
reason the Supreme Court has grappled with the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims for 
nearly forty years is precisely because the issue calls on courts to decide among hotly contested 
theories of effective representation.”); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 37 (“The difficulty 
is that although the goals established may be plausible, there are usually equally plausible reasons for 
seeking the opposite goals.”); Persily, supra note 105, at 678 (“[C]oncerns about representation and 
governance are of equal weight to concerns about electoral competition, and there is no 
philosophically uncontestable reason why judges should force one set of values rather than another 
down the throat of state governments.”).  
 132. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 133. See, e.g., Bruce Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Statute Process: The Continuing 
Quest for “Fair and Effective Representation,” 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 825 (1977); Gordon E. Baker, 
Judicial Determination of Political Gerrymandering: A “Totality of Circumstances” Approach, 3 J.L. 
& POL. 1 (1986); Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 77 (1985).  
 134. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 4. 
 135. Id. 
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Political questions deserve, even require, political answers.136 
Redistricting implicates deep questions of politics and democratic values 
that demand popular involvement—indeed more popular involvement 
rather than less. The search for neutrality as the solution to 
gerrymandering tries to avoid, rather than confront and embrace, the larger 
value questions inherent in redistricting. Turning to apolitical institutions, 
and away from legislatures and other political venues, seeks to depoliticize 
what should be put to the people through the democratic process. This is, 
to put it squarely, offensive to a democracy.  
B. The Costs of Political Insulation 
The apolitical character of courts and independent commissions brings 
profound costs to redistricting. The same virtue of political insulation that 
ensures courts and independent commissions will not be guided by 
political motivations also makes them particularly ill-suited in a different 
sense to the task of redistricting. Their political insulation renders them 
decidedly unaccountable to the electorate and isolated from popular 
sentiment. As we remove legislatures and elected officials from the 
redistricting process, we also remove legitimate democratic bodies from 
deciding what defining goals ought to replace self-interest in redistricting. 
We move toward allowing nonpolitical institutions to decide fundamental 
value questions nearly by fiat without institutional guarantees of popular 
oversight and input.137  
The political insulation of courts makes them particularly ill suited for 
deciding the value questions underlying redistricting.138 Judicial 
independence from popular influence is designed to insulate courts from 
majoritarian pressures, but this familiar insulation from politics also leaves 
 
 
 136. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 
(1980) (observing that “substantive decisions are generally to be made democratically in our society”).  
 137. To address this concern in the context of administrative law, Congress and the courts impose 
on administrative agencies a heavy layer of procedural requirements under the Administrative 
Procedure Act that helps promote political accountability, interest representation, and public 
accessibility. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: 
Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Essay, 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). 
 138. Richard Pildes objects that the question is not whether independent institutions are ideal, but 
whether they will handle redistricting better than “self-interested partisan actors inevitably seeking 
entrenchment.” Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 80–81. However, Pildes assumes that 
one must choose between independent institutions and the political process. I view this as a false 
choice. In the next Part, I argue that reform should opt for a middle path between these two 
alternatives that combines the strengths of both. See infra Part IV.  
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courts poorly equipped to serve as institutions of democratic 
policymaking.139 Courts, designed as they are to be politically insensitive 
and unaccountable, are inept at weighing the complex political 
considerations that should influence the redistricting process.140 It is an 
immense legislative challenge for the judicial branch to muster the 
necessary expertise and skill to supervise the redrawing of district maps, 
much less ultimately produce a redistricting map that adequately considers 
and integrates the many political concerns that redistricting inevitably 
raises.141 Whatever the result, the redistricting process produces winners 
and losers and strikes controversial tradeoffs that courts, democratically 
unaccountable and unrepresentative, cannot defend as the product of 
popular lawmaking.142 Redistricting is simply a legislative task for which 
courts lack the necessary democratic pedigree and institutional resources.  
The Court demonstrated its ineffectiveness at measuring public 
sentiment in Georgia v. Ashcroft.143 In the case, the Court placed great 
importance on what it viewed as African-American support for the 
redistricting plan at issue.144 The redistricting of Georgia’s state 
legislature, in Ashcroft, was controversial and potentially subject to 
vehement African-American objection.145 Democrats, at risk of losing 
control of the legislature, decided to disperse African-American voters 
across districts, instead of concentrating them in fewer districts, and thus 
 
 
 139. This classic objection is, of course, the basis of the “countermajoritarian difficulty.” See 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS (1962); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996); CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: 
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); Larry D. 
Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
 140. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (“[Courts] possess no distinctive 
mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s name.”); 
ELY, supra note 136, at 103 (noting that the political insulation of courts “does not give them some 
special pipeline to the genuine values of the American people: in fact it goes far to ensure that they 
won’t have one”).  
 141. See Persily, supra note 41; see also LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2006) (“Quite 
apart from the risk of acting without a legislature’s expertise, and quite apart from the difficulties a 
court faces in drawing a map that is fair and rational, the obligation placed upon the Federal Judiciary 
is unwelcome because drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most significant acts a 
State can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance.” (citations omitted)).  
 142. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“Courts—even when proceeding with best intentions—would risk assuming political, not legal, 
responsibility for a process that often produces ill will and distrust.”).  
 143. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 144. Id. at 469–73, 484, 489–90; see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 102 (D.D.C. 
2002) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting) (“I give great[] credence to the political expertise and motivation of 
Georgia’s African-American political leaders . . . .”). 
 145. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 469–71 (describing the Democratic plan to “unpack” African-
American districts).  
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increase the chances of holding more districts across the state with the 
help of these loyal Democratic voters.146 The question for the Court was 
the permissibility under the Voting Rights Act of the reduced assurances 
of descriptive representation for the African-American community.  
The Court held that the state could trade stronger guarantees for 
descriptive representation of African Americans, in favor of a greater 
chance for continued control of the state legislature by the Democrats, the 
favored party of African Americans.147 The Court explained that the 
Voting Rights Act permitted the state a “political choice of whether 
substantive or descriptive representation is preferable.”148 In this case, the 
state of Georgia could “choose, consistent with [section] 5, that it is better 
to risk having fewer minority representatives in order to achieve greater 
overall representation of a minority group by increasing the number of 
representatives sympathetic to the interests of minority voters.”149 This 
tradeoff, built into the Ashcroft redistricting, faithful to the purposes of the 
Voting Rights Act, might increase the political influence of the African-
American community. In the end, the Court deferred to what it saw as the 
political preference of the African-American community in favor of the 
Ashcroft tradeoff. Richard Pildes applauds the Court for its political 
assumptions in Ashcroft, in light of “the nearly unanimous support of a 
large black political delegation.”150 Indeed, legislative approval of the 
Ashcroft redistricting depended on the swing votes of those African-
American elected officials for passage.151 Based upon this evidence, the 
Court ruled that the Georgia redistricting was nonretrogressive under 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.152  
But the Court’s conclusion of African-American support for the 
Ashcroft tradeoff was far from safe. The Court’s inference about the 
 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 483. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 96. One of the justices speculated during oral 
argument that it would be “hard to believe that [African-American officials] didn’t have . . . the best 
interest of their—of their race in—in mind.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 
461 (No. 02-182). Heather Gerken concludes that “it obviously mattered a great deal to the Court that 
there was relative unanimity among African-American representatives about the wisdom of the plan.” 
Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 733 (2006). 
 151. See Jim Galloway & David Pendered, Lack of Democratic Support Delays Redistricting 
Vote, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 9, 2001, at 4E. Ten of eleven African-American state senators and 
thirty-three of thirty-four African-American state representatives voted for the plan. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 
at 471. The Court also emphasized repeatedly that Congressman John Lewis, a civil rights hero and 
Atlanta congressional representative, championed and testified in favor of the plan. Id. at 472, 489–90.  
 152. Id. at 488. 
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attitudes of the African-American community at large was based entirely 
on the support of African-American elected officials.153 Given the conflict 
of interest for elected officials in redistricting, the Court’s inference was 
unsound. On one hand, African-American officials in Georgia seemed not 
to be entrenching themselves into office.154 The Ashcroft redistricting 
made their re-election less secure by removing reliable African-American 
voters from their districts. On the other hand, the Court appeared to 
dismiss the possibility of any conflict of interest between African-
American elected representatives and the greater community.155 The Court 
noted only, without acknowledging contradiction, that one of the 
motivations for the Ashcroft redistricting was to retain chairmanships and 
leadership posts for these African-American officials.156  
The Court ignored that a telling array of organizations from the 
African-American community opposed the Ashcroft plan. The coalition 
represented everything from local community groups to national civil-
rights groups, almost all of whom boasted well-established pedigrees 
flowing from the Civil Rights Movement. The NAACP, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), RAINBOW/PUSH, and 
Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials filed an amicus brief with 
the Court opposing the Ashcroft plan.157 Prominent organizations from 
Atlanta’s African-American community also opposed pre-clearance, 
including a roster of Baptist churches with proud histories of civil-rights 
advocacy—Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Ebenezer Baptist Church among 
them.158 A wide range of civil-rights groups joined them in opposition, 
including the ACLU, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and AFL-
CIO.159 Nonetheless, the political insulation of the judiciary made it 
acutely difficult for courts to measure the political considerations that 
necessarily are part of the complicated calculus underlying legislative 
redistricting. Even when the Court purported to give agency to the 
African-American community, it ignored the telling opposition of grass-
 
 
 153. Id. at 479–85; see Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 92–93. 
 154. See Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 92 (noting that black legislators were “not 
demanding safer sinecures for themselves, as officeholders typically do, but taking risks to forge a 
winning coalition”). 
 155. See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 21, 33 (2004).  
 156. Ashcroft, 439 U.S. at 483–84. 
 157. See Brief for the Georgia Coalition for The Peoples’ Agenda as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellees, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (No. 02-182).  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
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roots organizations in the community, indeed almost every group except 
the incumbents in the legislature.  
Just as the political insulation of courts limits judicial effectiveness on 
redistricting matters, the political insulation of independent commissions 
limits their usefulness as well. In fact, the failure of Proposition 77 in 
California reflected the public’s dissatisfaction with relinquishing control 
over these types of decisions. Insulation from political influence in 
redistricting guards against self-entrenchment, but only by distancing the 
process from the political give-and-take that undergirds democratic 
legitimacy and popular support. By trying to strip away all political 
influences from redistricting, Proposition 77 raised the specter of an 
unrepresentative, unaccountable three-person commission striking the 
critical choices of democratic governance for the diverse state of 
California—a proposition that the California electorate rejected.  
California voters were not against removing redistricting power from 
the state legislature. Indeed, voters of all partisan stripes were strongly in 
favor of it—hence Proposition 77’s early popularity. More than seventy 
percent of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents agreed that “it is a 
conflict of interest for legislators to draw their own election districts.”160 
Seventy percent of Democrats and Republicans, and sixty-one percent of 
Independents, felt “it is better for California’s election districts to be 
drawn by . . . an independent commission.”161 Although voters favored the 
notion of a neutral, independent commission for redistricting, voters 
soured on the particulars of Proposition 77 once they realized the 
downside of political insulation and neutrality.162  
Voters learned that the political insulation of the proposed commission 
would necessarily limit political access and accountability.163 Proposition 
 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. ROSE INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE SURVEY ON 
REDISTRICTING—APRIL 2005 4 (2005).  
 162. Democratic voters, while quite favorable toward independent commissions in theory, were 
suspicious about the underlying political motivations of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 
sponsoring Proposition 77. When asked about Proposition 77 in April 2005, fifty-six percent of 
Democratic voters felt that Proposition 77 was a “Republican power grab,” compared to only ten 
percent of Republicans and thirty-two percent of Independents. Id. at 6. Proposition 77 ultimately lost 
at the polls because Schwarzenegger’s sagging popularity dragged Proposition 77 down with him, and 
Independents came to oppose Proposition 77 by November. In October 2005, fifty-seven percent of 
Independents opposed Proposition 77, compared to sixty-six percent of Democrats and twenty-six 
percent of Republicans in opposition. Press Release, Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal., Special Survey on 
Californians and the Initiative Process, If You Call It, Will They Come? Voter Interest in Special 
Election Surges, at 6 (Oct. 28, 2005). 
 163. A similar concern strengthened opposition to Issue 4 in Ohio. See Joe Hallett, State Issues 
Stir Both Sides of Aisle, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2005, at 01A; see also Jean Schmidt, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/4
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77’s lack of guarantees of representation and access in redistricting 
doomed it to electoral defeat. Proposition 77’s directives to its independent 
commission were necessarily vague, given the incredibly detailed and 
nuanced decisions that must be made in redistricting, to a degree that 
California voters found discomfiting.  
When an independent commission decides to redraw district lines 
across a town boundary or around an ethnic community, it must decide for 
itself how to weigh the multitude of political considerations in play.164 In 
Arizona, the state court of appeals defended the Arizona independent 
commission by explaining “the overriding fact that districting decisions 
require judgment.”165 Because the applicable directives are unavoidably 
inexact in practice, and because it is “not possible to produce a perfect 
map by feeding data into a computer,” establishment of an independent 
commission necessarily means that it must have flexibility and discretion 
“to reach reasonable conclusions on how to draw district lines.”166 For the 
same reasons, the California commission under Proposition 77 could not 
have ensured voters influence over the final shape of the redistricting the 
commission would have produced. The commission, insulated from public 
access and accountability, would necessarily have retained ultimate 
discretion for itself.  
Issue 4 in Ohio took a different path to reach the same disappointing 
result. To limit political influence on the independent commission, Issue 4 
commanded the commission to do nothing more than select the plan with 
the highest competitiveness score by designated formula.167 Issue 4 thus 
attempted to de-politicize redistricting by radically restricting the 
discretion of the Ohio independent commission. It blocked the 
unaccountable and unrepresentative policy discretion that California voters 
worried their independent commission would exercise. But in doing so, 
Issue 4 would have similarly precluded public deliberation and political 
influence regarding the proper balancing of socio-political interests. The 
mathematical computation of competitiveness scores would have 
 
 
Editorial, Why Ohio Voters Should Run from RON, PEOPLE’S DEFENDER (West Union, Ohio), Nov. 2, 
2005.  
 164. See Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 
P.3d 843, 857–58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (charging the Independent Commission to use flexibility and 
judgment to “reach reasonable conclusions” in determining distinct lines without ignoring 
constitutional considerations); see also Mayor of Cambridge v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 765 N.E.2d 
749, 755 (Mass. 2002) (concluding that redistricting “necessarily involves the use of discretion”); State 
ex rel. S. St. Paul v. Hetherington, 61 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Minn. 1953) (same).  
 165. See Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting, 121 P.3d at 857. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Issue 4, supra note 60. 
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dominated all other considerations. Issue 4 tried to solve the troubling 
problem of politically unaccountable policymaking by independent 
commissions by legislating away virtually all the necessary complexity of 
the political questions inherent in redistricting.  
C. The Need for a Third Way in Redistricting 
The proper approach for resolving the political questions inherent in 
redistricting is not to assume them away or delegate them to a court or 
commission, but to address them forthrightly through a political process. 
Contestable questions promise no indisputably “correct” solutions with 
which everyone will agree.168 The polity can arrive at difficult, 
controversial determinations, not by guaranteeing correct outcomes, but by 
guaranteeing a legitimate democratic process through which all interests 
have an opportunity to fight for their position.169 Like an election contest 
between candidates, the resulting resolution of the process cannot be 
proved objectively correct. Instead, political institutions simply deliberate, 
weigh competing interests, and arrive at a decision—a discretionary one 
accountable to the electoral process. The resulting resolution is 
legitimately and fairly decided, provided that the process by which it was 
reached was legitimate and fair.  
Pluralist politics through the legislative process, not through insulated 
courts or committees, usually offer the best venue for this articulation and 
aggregation of societal interests into the compromise of public policy. 
Redistricting must be conducted through a process that “allows a vast 
number of groups and individuals to participate plausibly in the process of 
compromise, allowing their voices to be heard.”170 The legislative process 
offers the appropriate democratic venue for this “pull, haul, and trade”171 
of pluralist politics. The legislative process is an open, public forum in 
which all constituencies can advocate for their interests, develop alliances, 
and negotiate workable compromises. It hosts deliberation and debate 
about the public good before a popular audience, subject to the familiar 
check of electoral accountability.  
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term—Foreword: The 
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 73 (1962) (arguing that redistricting cannot be reduced 
to anything even resembling “an exercise of reason”).  
 169. See generally ELY, supra note 136, at 101–04; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967).  
 170. Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness in 
Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1622 (2005).  
 171. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).  
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Indeed, the usual method of deciding political questions is to submit 
them to political institutions. “In a representative democracy,” John Hart 
Ely argued, “value determinations are to be made by our elected 
representatives.”172 Just so, the political branches handle legislative 
redistricting in most states. Redistricting entails the legislative work of 
“accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy.”173 Legislatures, 
as democratically elected bodies, possess the popular pedigree to make the 
complicated, value-laden policy judgments intrinsic to structuring the 
electoral system. In accordance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
indicated that redistricting is the special responsibility of the state 
legislature.174 Redistricting should be conducted with the accessibility and 
accountability of the political process.  
For this reason, one camp of commentators argues that reform is 
counterproductive and redistricting ought to remain in the hands of 
legislatures.175 Nathaniel Persily contends that the contestability of value 
judgments militates toward leaving “the ultimate decision to the 
admittedly self-interested but more accountable political bodies.”176 
Elected bodies are better suited to “strike the balance between the 
competing political values central to democratic government.”177 
Likewise, Daniel Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg argue that, like 
almost any other issue, redistricting is “one of the objects of the political 
struggle, not one of its ground rules.”178 As a consequence, “we expect the 
legislators of our party to draw district lines in a manner consistent with 
the overall conception of the public interest embodied by our party.”179  
Nonetheless, institutional reform is necessary because maintaining 
redistricting by elected officials and political bodies leaves unaddressed 
the original problem—political institutions are populated by elected 
 
 
 172. ELY, supra note 136, at 103.  
 173. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 174. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (“The task of redistricting is best left 
to state legislatures . . . .”); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973) (“We have adhered to the 
view that state legislatures have ‘primary jurisdiction’ over legislative reapportionment.”); see also 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 935 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he task should remain 
within the domain of state legislatures.”). 
 175. Daniel Ortiz describes this position as the “got theory” argument. See Ortiz, supra note 103, 
at 460.  
 176. Persily, supra note 105, at 680–81.  
 177. Id. at 680.  
 178. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 75.  
 179. Id.; see also Jim Siegel, State Issue 4; GOP Isn’t Pushing to Make Changes in Redistricting, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 2005, at 5D (quoting a Republican leader who reasons that “the people 
who are involved with [redistricting] are elected, and if people don’t think they do a good job, they 
don’t re-elect them”).  
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officials with an overriding conflict of interest on redistricting and other 
rules of electoral competition. Redistricting presents a fundamental 
conundrum to the traditional formula. Incumbents, while blessed with 
democratic authority, also are tempted to exercise that authority for their 
own self-interest with respect to legislating the rules of the game. 
Legislators and other elected officials, when they redraw the lines of their 
own districts, have tremendous incentive to ensure themselves continued 
service in office.180 Indeed, they do precisely this in practice.181  
Redistricting differs from many other policy issues because it directly 
structures elected officials’ prospects for re-election.182 An elected official 
or political party hurts its chances of re-election if it takes an unpopular 
position on tax cuts. An elected official or political party that entrenches 
itself through redistricting, on the other hand, increases its chances of re-
election regardless whether the redistricting is popular with the public. It is 
insufficient to expect the threat of the next election to restrain elected 
officials and political parties from using redistricting to entrench 
themselves, because redistricting helps ensure their re-election and thus 
makes the next election less threatening in the first place. The problem of 
incumbent lockup thus complicates the usual delegation of redistricting 
authority with elected officials whose electoral accountability typically 
provides a popular safeguard.  
The current redistricting debate therefore occurs between camps that 
appear diametrically opposed. One camp believes that redistricting must 
be decided by legislatures and other politically accountable institutions.183 
It views the risk of incumbent entrenchment as a necessary cost of 
securing political answers from political institutions. The other camp 
believes that redistricting must be withdrawn from legislatures and given 
to courts or independent commissions.184 It views the risk of incumbent 
entrenchment to be prohibitive and is willing to compromise political 
 
 
 180. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 136, at 121 (commenting that the incentive of elected officials is to 
maintain whatever districting arrangement that “got and keeps them where they are”); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1643, 1661–69 (1993); Kang, supra note 24.  
 181. Kang, supra note 24, at 446 (discussing incumbent tendency to “rig their re-election 
prospects by packing their own districts with friendly voters, which scares off or trounces challengers 
attempting to take their seats”). 
 182. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial 
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).  
 183. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 105, at 180; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108; Persily, 
supra note 105. 
 184. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 182; Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 44–47.  
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accountability as a necessary cost of preventing self-interested 
redistricting.  
However, both sides find themselves confronting what is, in fact, a 
false dilemma.185 The need for political answers in redistricting ought to 
guide reform toward new institutional approaches, rather than present a 
dead end. Political accountability and self-interested entrenchment need 
not run together inextricably in redistricting. The special challenge for 
redistricting is designing a policymaking process that provides democratic 
accountability and popular input, but does not implicate the same risks of 
self-interested entrenchment inherent in the political branches of 
government. The goal is to find political channels for answering political 
questions, but to do so without allowing political self-interest to dominate 
the process. 
IV. DEMOCRATIZING REDISTRICTING 
I propose the use of direct democracy in legislative redistricting as a 
middle path, a third way, between total acquiescence to political 
gerrymandering on one hand and unconditional rejection of politics, under 
any form, in redistricting on the other hand. Direct democracy provides a 
means to restructure the incentives within the legislative process of 
redistricting and revive the benefits of pluralist politics, without permitting 
political self-interest to subsume the public interest. Contrary to current 
reform trends, redistricting would be channeled in healthier directions 
through more politics, not less.  
Direct democracy helps construct a distinctly political process of 
redistricting that empowers the general public itself to guard the public 
interest. A basic requirement that legislative redistricting plans be subject 
to statewide popular approval for enactment would allow a democratic 
process to decide and strike the critical value choices required in 
redistricting. Direct democracy places ultimate power for redistricting in 
the hands of the proper decisionmaker with democratic authority—the 
people whom governing institutions should be designed to serve and 
represent.  
 
 
 185. See, e.g., Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 120, at 80–81 (“The question is whether 
intermediate institutions, designed in particular ways, are likely to handle these tasks better than self-
interested partisan actors inevitably seeking entrenchment of both themselves and their parties.”); 
Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Independent Commissions, 
55 DUKE L.J. 333, 339 (2005) (arguing that independent commissions are not ideal but “may represent 
the best solution available under the current legal framework”). 
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A. Direct Democracy and Incumbent Entrenchment  
The dilemma of redistricting is that important structural matters like 
redistricting must be handled through a political process, but the regular 
political process perverts redistricting into an exercise in self-dealing and 
incumbent protection by self-interested insiders. In most matters of public 
policy, “[t]he mechanism for resolving political contests in our society is 
the election.”186 However, in the circumstances of redistricting, it is the 
direct democratic election that best serves the public’s interests. Direct 
democracy enables the people, the real stakeholders in democratic design, 
to bypass their elected officials on this particular issue. This familiar virtue 
of direct democracy makes it peculiarly well-suited for matters of 
democratic design.  
Progressive reformers at the turn of the twentieth century intended 
direct democracy as a remedy for exactly the type of self-dealing by self-
interested elected officials that occurs in redistricting through the normal 
legislative process.187 Direct democracy bypasses the legislature and 
makes law directly without the interference of self-interested elected 
officials. “[D]irect democracy allows for an end-run around incumbents, 
allowing the median voter in a jurisdiction to enact institutional reforms 
seen as against the interests of political insiders.”188 Submitting 
redistricting to direct democracy thus plays to direct democracy’s defining 
strength.  
Requiring new redistricting plans to win statewide popular approval 
through direct democracy would allow the public a veto over excessively 
partisan or otherwise excessively self-interested proposals. A requirement 
that voters must vote on and approve the specific redistricting scheme 
itself, the actual map, for the redistricting to take legal effect in subsequent 
elections, would invest the general public with ultimate authority over 
redistricting. Direct democracy provides a popular check against attempts 
 
 
 186. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 74. 
 187. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1984); Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the 
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11 
(1997). Even today, groups turn to direct democracy when the normal legislative channels prove 
unsympathetic to their appeals.  
 188. Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through Democracy: 
The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 998 (2005); see also 
Caroline J. Tolbert, Changing Rules for State Legislatures: Direct Democracy and Governance 
Policies, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 171 (Shaun 
Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998) (finding a relationship between initiative 
usage and passage of governance reforms).  
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by incumbents to skew the competitive rules of election law that govern 
them and opens a powerful channel through which to ensure a healthy 
political process. Direct democracy offers what Adrian Vermeule and 
Jacob Gerson call a “hard” solution:189 it changes the institutional rules 
that govern the redistricting process to introduce a new, better set of 
incentives for elected officials and new, better opportunities for voters to 
defend their interests.  
By requiring popular approval for enactment, direct democracy 
properly places decisionmaking authority with the people to design their 
representative institutions. Direct democracy allows the public a direct 
choice in the necessary tradeoffs among competing democratic values in 
redistricting in a manner that best achieves its normative commitments and 
governance interests. The public can help decide directly whether its 
legislative districts will be designed to maximize electoral competition, 
protect incumbents, or preserve existing political subdivisions. The public 
can help decide whether any of these goals deserves overriding priority, or 
whether any ought to be discarded. On one hand, direct democracy 
provides a mechanism for moving the redistricting process toward more 
public-spirited outcomes by giving the electorate a veto against excessive 
partisan gerrymandering and incumbent lockup. On the other hand, the 
electorate may decide that it actually wishes to protect incumbents and 
ensure their re-election. In either case, the decision would be made by the 
general public, rather than through narrow self-dealing by those very 
incumbents whose jobs are at stake.  
Voters effectively use direct democracy, or the threat of direct 
democracy,190 to enact policy that constrains self-entrenchment by elected 
officials. Regardless how well, or how poorly, direct democracy performs 
in other policy domains, it is particularly useful as a potential bypass of 
incumbents in the legislature and avenue for structural reforms that elected 
officials might oppose. Nine of the thirteen states that currently have a 
redistricting commission also happen to be states that provide for popular 
 
 
 189. Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as Voting Rules, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2006).  
 190. The possibility that reformers may use the initiative to bypass the state legislature increases 
the likelihood that the legislature will accede, at least to some degree, to popular demands. See, e.g., 
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Pressuring Legislatures Through the Use of Initiatives: Two Forms of Indirect 
Influence, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 191 (Shaun 
Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998); Nolan McCarty, Commentary on 
“Regulating Democracy Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law 
Reform”, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035 (2005).  
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initiatives.191 Proposition 77 in California and Issue 4 in Ohio, obviously, 
also were initiatives that stood little chance in the state legislature but 
received a hearing in the November statewide election. Legislative term 
limits are another example. Twenty-two of the twenty-four states that 
enacted term limits on their congressional representatives acted through 
direct democracy.192 Among the states that had no provision for direct 
democracy, only one enacted congressional term limits.193 Likewise, 
fifteen of twenty-four states that have a provision for popular initiatives 
have enacted term limits on state legislators, while only one of twenty-six 
states without the initiative has passed legislative term limits.194  
Even before Baker v. Carr, voters managed to exercise direct 
democracy on occasion to reapportion their state legislatures. Voters in 
states with the initiative were able to require reapportionment of state 
legislatures that were not required legally to reapportion themselves before 
the U.S. Supreme Court instituted the one person, one vote rule in 1964. 
From 1918 to 1962, the voters of eight states voted at least ten times to 
update the apportionment of their legislatures.195 In other words, the 
voting majority in a number of states used the chance to vote on 
redistricting matters to defend its democratic prerogatives and update state 
apportionment to reflect changes in the electorate.  
California’s Proposition 77 offered statewide popular ratification of the 
independent commission’s redistricting plan, but only after the 
commission had done its work without the necessary political process in 
advance. The problem with ex post ratification, and the reason that this 
feature went largely ignored, was that it offered a public vote without any 
antecedent opportunity for the public and interested groups to engage in 
the lawmaking process and influence the shape of the redistricting plan 
before it went into effect. As a practical matter, Proposition 77’s provision 
of direct democratic approval served mainly as a fail-safe, an opportunity 
for the public to veto unacceptable plans, rather than to influence directly 
or choose among different plans in an affirmative vote. Direct democratic 
 
 
 191. See also Tolbert, supra note 188 (finding similar results in 1998); Initiative & Referendum 
Institute, State I & R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  
 192. See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 111 (1997); 
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 510 
(1997). The statistic applies only through 1995, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional congressional term limits, at least when enacted by individual states, in U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  
 193. See Elhauge, supra note 192, at 111. 
 194. Persily & Anderson, supra note 188, at 1006.  
 195. See data available at Initiative & Referendum Institute, www.iandrinstitute.org (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2007).  
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ratification, only after the commission’s chosen plan is given legal effect 
in an election, offered a hollow promise of popular involvement. As a 
result, the campaign debate focused mainly on the absence of Proposition 
77 guarantees of political representation and access in redistricting, rather 
than ex post popular ratification. However, as explained in the following 
section, when coupled with an open legislative process for redistricting 
that invites the public to participate, direct democracy transforms the 
incentives of elected officials and reinvigorates the pluralist politics of 
redistricting.  
If direct democracy works so well, why does it not already prevent 
gerrymandering in states where it is available? Theoretically, unhappy 
voters in a gerrymandered state already should be able to use the initiative 
process to enact a ballot measure that would abrogate any unwanted 
gerrymander. However, a problem with direct democracy is the high cost 
of agenda setting.196 The general electorate might vote for a ballot measure 
to abrogate a gerrymander, but the necessary initial step of qualifying a 
ballot measure for the ballot in the first place is expensive and 
burdensome. Gathering the thousands of signatures required for ballot 
qualification requires tremendous resources.197 As a consequence, for 
better or worse, wealthier interests disproportionately set the agenda for 
direct democracy and decide what measures appear on the ballot. Ballot 
measures that restructure the electoral system, thus, are most likely to 
qualify for the ballot when the effect of election reform would coincide 
closely with the political interests of some resourceful group of political 
insiders, as in the cases of Proposition 77198 and also Proposition 198199 in 
California. As a result, ballot qualification for reform measures provides 
an unreliable check on legislative redistricting. The current costs of 
exercising direct democracy, specifically ballot qualification, are simply 
too high to be used on a regular basis.  
 
 
 196. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 17 (1997).  
 197. See Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum 
Process: Evidence of its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN 
LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 73 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001); Elizabeth Garrett, 
Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 240–42 (2004).  
 198. See Kang, supra note 24 (discussing Governor Schwarzenegger’s motivations for 
championing Proposition 77). 
 199. Proposition 198 proposed a blanket primary system in which voters could vote in any party’s 
primary election, regardless of their own party registration, on an office-by-office basis, all on a single 
ballot. See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 
140, 164–66 (2005) (discussing Proposition 198 and Tom Campbell’s reasons for sponsoring it).  
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An institutional requirement that a redistricting plan must win popular 
approval for enactment would guarantee the general electorate a chance to 
veto any gerrymander. An institutional requirement of popular approval 
reduces the costs of direct democracy in the area of redistricting. Ballot 
qualification, in essence, would be free. And here, once given the chance 
to vote directly on redistricting matters, voters can effectively defend the 
public interest from the self-interest of political insiders. In short, direct 
democracy allows for popular voice, necessary and valuable in making the 
difficult value tradeoffs in redistricting, while empowering the general 
electorate to guard against excessive gerrymandering and rent-seeking by 
the political insiders who currently control redistricting.  
B. Transforming the Legislative Process, Transforming Partisanship in 
Redistricting  
I propose the following reform procedures for redistricting: (1) any 
redistricting plan would be subject to the requirement of statewide popular 
approval as a condition of enactment; and (2) the redistricting plans 
themselves, two in my proposal, to be presented for a public vote, would 
be developed through the legislature. That is, redistricting plans offered to 
the public for a vote should be drafted through the regular political 
channels. State legislators would deliberate, draft, and vote for 
redistricting proposals, subject to public hearing and discussion, but under 
a modified limited-vote regime designed to induce competition toward the 
median. Although there may be many proposals under consideration, each 
legislator would be entitled to only a single vote and could cast that vote 
for only one proposal, among the several on the table, to endorse for ballot 
placement. The two proposals yielding the greatest number of votes in the 
legislature would advance to the ballot for popular decision. The 
legislative process would thus yield two alternative redistricting maps, 
each placed on the ballot for a statewide direct democratic election with 
the winning proposal to be enacted for subsequent elections.  
The objective of this arrangement is to create institutional incentives in 
redistricting toward the median preference in the general electorate.200 
First, proponents of any proposal would need to broaden the appeal of 
 
 
 200. However, I do not purport to designate a single optimal set of institutional arrangements. The 
optimal arrangement is an institutional flexibility across states and representative bodies that allows 
them to experiment with processes and outcomes. The critical element in this account is the necessity 
of rejecting courts and independent commissions, insulated from the political process, as ultimate 
solutions. 
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their proposals sufficiently to finish with the most or second-most votes in 
the legislature. Each major party would organize and develop support in 
the legislature for its own redistricting plan.201 Second, each party then 
would need to anticipate the prospective electoral response of the general 
electorate once its proposal is on the ballot. Any proposal too narrowly 
focused on the interests of party incumbents who proffered it risks defeat 
at the hands of the general electorate. As a result, the requirement of a 
statewide popular vote re-creates the pressure toward the preferences of 
the median voter in the general electorate, just as the major parties 
gravitate toward the political middle in candidate elections. 
A straightforward application of the Median Voter Theorem illustrates 
this dynamic.202 Assume a unidimensional policy space R, representing 
the degree to which a redistricting plan is biased toward Republican 
candidates at the expense of Democratic candidates.203 The Democrats 
offer a redistricting plan, d, and the Republicans offer a plan, r, such that d 
< r along R. Each voter, i, has an ideal preference, xi, along R that 
expresses i’s Euclidean preferences on redistricting, represented by the 
function, ui (p) = – (xi – p)2, where p = [d, r].204 Voter i is therefore 
indifferent between d and r when xi is located exactly halfway between d 
and r along the unidimensional space R as follows: 
  (1)   ui (d) = ui (r) 
  (2)   – (xi – d)2 = – (xi – r)2 
  (3)   – ((xi – d)/2)2 = – ((d – r)/2)2 
 
 
 201. See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? (1995); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. 
MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993). 
 202. See generally Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 
23 (1948); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (2d 
prtg. 1967); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).  
 203. In other words, R represents a spectrum with maximum partisan bias favoring Democratic 
candidates on one extreme, and maximum partisan bias favoring Republicans on the other extreme, 
with no partisan bias for either party at its midpoint. Of course, redistricting policy is more nuanced 
than this stylization, but the assumption correctly captures the unavoidable tradeoff at the margin 
between the goals of incumbent entrenchment and other goals valued by the public in redistricting. 
Given an assumption that the median voter favors incumbent entrenchment of the majority party less 
than the incumbents of the majority party, the results under my proposal produce less entrenchment, 
and redistricting policy closer to the median voter’s ideal, than the results under simple majority rule in 
the legislature without direct democracy.  
 204. That is, assuming single-peaked preferences, a voter’s utility increases as the plan in question 
approaches the voter’s ideal preference, as I explain above. As is standard, I also assume that the 
parties are motivated in part by policy interests and have imperfect information about the exact 
position of the median voter. 
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Voter xi is indifferent between d and r, because the difference between 
d and r is squared. However, if one party creeps closer to voter i’s ideal 
point, it will win voter i’s vote. For instance, assume that the Democrats, 
instead of proposing d, offers d*, closer to xi (such that (d + r)/2 > d* > d); 
then the following results: 
  (4)   – (xi – d*)2 < – (xi – d)2 
Voter i thus prefers and votes for d* over both d and r. The same 
argument holds with respect to the Republicans when r* < r. Voter i 
prefers and votes for r when r moves closer to pi as follows: 
  (5)   – (xi – r*)2 < – (xi – r)2 
Substitute the median voter, m, for voter i. By definition, median voter 
m’s ideal preference sits at the midpoint of all voters’ preferences such that 
d, or r, will win majority approval only if it wins the median voter m’s 
vote:  
Median Voter (pm) 
½ voters ½ voters 
                          d          r 
Put simply, the Democrats will be defeated and their redistricting 
proposal will not be enacted into law unless they can produce a 
redistricting proposal that more closely matches the median voter’s ideal 
than the Republicans’ proposal. The party that best caters to the median 
voter’s preference will win; the party that fails will lose and receive no 
payoff at all.  
For this reason, the coupling of a requirement of direct democratic 
approval would transform the legislative process leading to the public 
vote. Institutional incentives in redistricting would change, from exclusive 
focus on maximizing the interests of majority-party incumbents, to 
winning the median voter in the general electorate. My proposal enlists the 
familiar tools of electoral competition and accountability to induce 
political insiders to serve the public interest.  
By submitting redistricting ultimately to direct democracy, my 
proposal transfers the politics of redistricting from the backroom to the 
public forum. In the backroom, fairness, justice, community interest, equal 
representation, and equality become “so many words in a dictionary [that] 
have little or no relationship to where the lines are drawn.”205 Politicians 
 
 
 205. CAIN, supra note 112, at 2 (quoting California state senator H.L. Richardson).  
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under any conditions would press for redistricting concessions that serve 
their self-interest. But when redistricting is left exclusively to the 
legislative process, politicians are asked to do nothing more than that. 
They are almost never asked to justify their preferences in these private 
backroom negotiations. As a former Speaker of the California Assembly 
once put it, redistricting is “the most political, most crass, most selfish act 
that any legislator ever engages in.”206 Public opinion is almost entirely 
irrelevant and inconsequential.207 Indeed, it is no surprise that some of the 
most infamous partisan gerrymanders occurred with almost no public 
hearings or debate.208 The practical irrelevance of public opinion in 
contemporary redistricting is illustrated by the fact that I have been unable 
to find in the public record any polling results surveying public opinion 
about the Ashcroft redistricting. In contrast, a requirement of statewide 
approval would make public opinion central to redistricting. Legislators 
would be forced to construct a redistricting proposal that could survive 
public scrutiny and attract the median voter’s vote.  
In the public forum, politicians would be forced to defend and 
campaign in favor of their preferred proposal to win the public’s vote. This 
process of public deliberation and debate would invite interest groups of 
all sorts to participate and leverage their public endorsement for influence 
on the redistricting process.209 A requirement of popular approval gives 
value in the battle for public opinion to the endorsements of trusted groups 
and leaders who can vouch for the public-spiritedness of a particular 
redistricting plan. Social science research demonstrates that voters 
effectively use heuristic cues, such as the endorsements of trusted civic 
groups and public advocates, to reach sensible voting decisions in direct 
democracy.210 The endorsement of political reform groups like Common 
 
 
 206. Id. at 1 (quoting Bob Moretti).  
 207. See, e.g., Chandler Brown, Redrawn Districts a Mixed Bag, ATL. J.-CONST., Dec. 26, 2005, 
at 1C (“The changes [from the 2004 congressional redistricting in Georgia] have drawn little publicity 
or controversy, to the point that political pundits—forget the average voter—aren’t familiar with the 
new boundaries.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial 
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1987) (noting that the Davis v. Bandemer 
gerrymander was made public only two days before the end of the legislative session, without 
significant public participation or any public hearings).  
 209. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 150, at 718–43 (advocating interest-group involvement in a 
reformed preclearance process under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Michael S. Kang, From 
Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1089–95 (2005) (discussing potential benefits from interest-group involvement 
and grass roots campaigning). 
 210. See Mark Forehand, John Gastil & Mark A. Smith, Endorsements as Voting Cues: Heuristic 
and Systematic Processing in Initiative Elections, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2215 (2004); Michael 
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Cause, for example, that might be willing to advocate in favor of a 
redistricting plan as fairer or more competitive, would be particularly 
valuable as a positive signal to voters. The desire to attract the support of 
popular interests or public-interest groups would encourage the major 
parties to look past narrow partisan self-interest and incorporate concerns 
that would resonate with the public. Only through this full political 
process can the redistricting process offer the necessary opportunities for 
interested constituencies to press for their priorities and thereby produce 
redistricting plans that balance out the weighty political considerations 
running in every direction.  
Subjecting redistricting plans to a statewide popular vote through direct 
democracy offers a real chance not to eliminate partisanship in 
redistricting, but to transform its meaning and usage. Currently, in states 
where redistricting is left to the legislative process, partisanship is a 
currency in which party politicians privately deal to extract the best 
possible arrangement for themselves. Wielded by voters rather than 
politicians, partisanship admittedly would influence voting decisions about 
redistricting. But partisan identification of voters would matter only to the 
degree that party politicians can convince voters to trust their 
recommendations. Politicians would need to justify and advocate for their 
preferred proposals, as against competing proposals, with reference to the 
public interest.211  
Deciding redistricting through direct democracy, as a consequence, 
would “launder” the political discourse and force politicians to justify their 
preferences in public-sounding terms.212 Direct democracy would 
introduce to the public the fundamental structural decisions that 
redistricting requires. Politicians would be forced to engage in a political 
debate about how best to structure the state electoral system and articulate 
why any favored proposal would better serve the polity’s best interests. 
Democratizing redistricting thus both gives birth to a public discourse 
about redistricting and launders the purposes of redistricting in a way that 
 
 
S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence through Heuristic Cues and 
“Disclosure Plus”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: 
Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 
(1994).  
 211. Cf. CAIN, supra note 112, at 190 (arguing in favor of public disclosure during redistricting); 
Issacharoff, supra note 180, at 1697 (arguing in favor of bringing the redistricting process out in the 
open where it would be subject to “the sanitizing effect of public scrutiny”).  
 212. See generally Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE THEORY 75, 75–77 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986); see also BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8–10 (1980).  
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educates and pushes its politics in healthier directions.213 This is a political 
conversation in which a democracy ought to be engaged, but generally is 
not. Redistricting, one of the most important events in structuring the 
state’s electoral institutions, occurs without much public notice or 
awareness. Direct democracy brings opportunity for public deliberation 
and debate on redistricting, through a political campaign leading up to the 
direct democratic election, about the shape and priorities for democratic 
restructuring.  
Political parties and their elected officials would have every incentive 
to act responsibly on redistricting precisely because the democratization of 
redistricting would place their political reputations at stake. The popular 
vote would serve as a check to excessively self-interested or irresponsible 
partisan behavior in redistricting. The public could hold the parties 
accountable for their positions on redistricting, to the degree that the 
parties and their representatives fail to act responsibly.214 Justice Scalia 
asked, “How much partisanship is too much?”215 Democratizing the 
redistricting process, and highlighting the question for public decision, 
allows the public to answer the question for itself. The major parties and 
elected officials would be held accountable for their redistricting positions 
and proposals on redistricting. To the degree that the public feels that 
elected officials and the political parties go too far, subsequent elections 
offer a political check.  
The fact that one party has won a majority in the previous election does 
not guarantee that it will win what it wants in redistricting through direct 
democracy. A numerical advantage of one party over another does not 
guarantee victories in direct democracy any more so than it guarantees 
successive victories in candidate elections. Just as in candidate elections, 
both parties compete for the large mass of uncommitted voters in the 
middle who swing the election one way or the other. To win those votes, 
the major parties are forced to articulate appeals for their favored 
redistricting plan in terms that extend beyond mere partisanship and self-
interest. The major parties cannot look only to their base constituencies to 
win a general election; they also must develop a public agenda that is 
attractive to centrist independents as well. The parties are accustomed to 
 
 
 213. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 740–44 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1539, 1545 (1988) (“The requirement of appeal to public-regarding reasons may make it more 
likely that public-regarding legislation will actually be enacted.”). 
 214. See Barkow, supra note 114, at 325–28 (contending that the democratic process can police 
irresponsible activity by elected officials).  
 215. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 297 (2004). 
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aggregating political preferences within their coalition and advocating 
those choices before the general electorate.216 They perform exactly this 
function in candidate elections by striking pragmatic compromises among 
their constituents that bear a chance of attracting the median voter’s 
approval. Redistricting by direct democracy thus encourages the major 
parties to restructure the system in ways that appeal to independent voters 
and curb their own self-entrenching tendencies.  
The recent experiences with Proposition 77 and Issue 4 offer additional 
hope in this regard. Independent voters were critical in defeating both 
ballot measures.217 Of course, partisanship mattered in voting on both 
ballot measures. Democrats were more likely to vote against Proposition 
77 and for Issue 4, and vice-versa for Republicans.218 But it is unsurprising 
that partisan identification influenced voting because research in political 
science finds that partisan identification serves as the average voter’s 
structuring framework for virtually every aspect of political 
understanding.219 Voters in California and Ohio relied in part on partisan 
identification to help figure out their positions on Proposition 77 and Issue 
4, but they eventually reached sensible conclusions about the ballot 
measures. In both states, voters sniffed out what seemed like partisan 
opportunism by the proponents and identified substantive concerns about 
the proposals for independent commissions.220 Indeed, in both states, large 
majorities rejected the ballot measures. Roughly sixty percent of 
Californians rejected Proposition 77, which carried a majority in only five 
of fifty-eight counties.221 Almost seventy percent of Ohioans rejected 
 
 
 216. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT 
AND CONSENT (1967); Kang, supra note 199; Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of 
Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (2001); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as 
Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813 (2000).  
 217. See JEHT FOUNDATION, REDISTRICTING IN CA AND OH: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM 
RESEARCH AMONG VOTERS IN OHIO AND CALIFORNIA (Nov. 2005), http://electionupdates.caltech.edu 
/JEHT_redistricting.pdf. 
 218. Id. (finding that ninety percent of Democrats voted against Proposition 77 and forty-nine 
percent of Democrats voted in favor of Issue 4, while seventy-one percent of Republicans voted for 
Proposition 77 and eighty-eight percent of Republicans voted against Issue 4); see also Todd Donovan 
& Joseph R. Snipp, Support for Legislative Term Limits in California: Group Representation, 
Partisanship, and Campaign Information, 56 J. POL. 492 (1994) (finding greater support among 
minority-party voters for term limits).  
 219. See generally BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN 
A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 14–34 (1954); ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 
UNABRIDGED EDITION 120–45 (1980); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER (1991); Kang, 
supra note 210.  
 220. See Hirsch & Mann, supra note 75 (arguing that voters viewed the ballot measures as a 
“power grab by the ‘out’ party”).  
 221. Cal. Sec’y of State, Special Statewide Election, Proposition 77, Map, http://vote2005.ss. 
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Issue 4, which failed to win even one of Ohio’s eighty-eight counties.222 A 
decisive factor in both states was that Independent voters, after learning 
more about the ballot measures, voted strongly in opposition.223  
In any event, when it comes to issues of government process, popular 
dissatisfaction is strikingly nonpartisan.224 Empirical research by political 
scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse distinguishes political 
preferences over government policy from political preferences over 
government process.225 Although preferences over policy correlate tightly 
with partisan identification, preferences over process do so only loosely.226 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find that partisan identification does not 
influence people’s support for structural reforms like campaign finance 
and increased use of direct democracy, finding similar approval among 
Democrats and Republicans.227 For instance, voters bonded across party 
lines and overwhelmingly rejected the guidance of the major parties in 
deciding on the most prominent ballot measure during the past decade 
dealing with structural electoral reform, Proposition 198 in California.228 
Featured in the U.S. Supreme Court case California Democratic Party v. 
Jones,229 solid majorities of Republican, Democratic, and Independent 
voters voted in favor of the blanket primary proposed by Proposition 198, 
despite the opposition of the major parties.230 Voters responded as 
nonpartisans with the public’s best interests in mind.  
Direct democracy empowers voters to make affirmative, sometimes 
unexpected choices about how to structure the electoral system. On a 
 
 
ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR077.htm. 
 222. Ohio Sec’y of State, Breakdown By County, State Issue 4 (Nov. 8, 2005), http://www.sos. 
state.oh.us/SOS/ElectionsVoter/results2005.aspx?Section=1168 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 223. See JEHT FOUNDATION, supra note 217 (finding that fifty-six percent of Independents voted 
against Proposition 77 and seventy-three percent of Independents voted against Issue 4).  
 224. There is certainly no reason to believe that voters would tend to vote purely on narrowly 
partisan grounds more so than elected representatives in the legislature. Cf. Baker, supra note 213, at 
748.  
 225. See generally JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: 
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK (2002); JOHN R. HIBBING & 
ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995).  
 226. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY, supra note 225, at 49–54 (arguing 
that what people want government to do, and how they want government to do it, are different things).  
 227. Id. at 75–77.  
 228. Debra J. Saunders, Rancor and Gridlock, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 2004, at E5.  
 229. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).  
 230. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (reporting that 
sixty-one percent of Democrats, fifty-seven percent of Republicans, and sixty-nine percent of 
Independents voted for Proposition 198), aff’d, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 567 
(2000).  
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ballot measure made famous by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. 
Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,231 the voting majority of 
Colorado clearly voted against the maximization of its political power. 
Colorado voters voted on two competing ballot measures in 1962. 
Amendment No. 7 proposed a redistricting of the state legislature that 
would have retained a state senate deviating from the rule of one person, 
one vote, along the lines of the federal analogy, with effective 
overrepresentation for rural regions of the state.232 Amendment No. 7 
passed by a landslide233 and won a majority vote of every county in the 
state.234 Voters simultaneously rejected a competing proposal on the same 
ballot, Amendment No. 8, that proposed a three-person independent 
commission to redistrict both houses of the state legislature on a strict 
basis of one person, one vote.235 By choosing Amendment No. 7, a 
popular majority effectively consented to a diminution in its representation 
by choosing deviation from the rule of one person, one vote.236 In other 
words, direct democracy permitted Colorado voters to control the 
redistricting process (and defend against self-entrenchment by political 
insiders if need be), but the voters nonetheless made a deliberate choice 
for minority voice.237  
 
 
 231. 337 U.S. 713 (1964). 
 232. Id. at 717–19. 
 233. Id. at 717 (describing the vote of 305,700 in favor to 172,725 against).  
 234. See id. at 731. 
 235. Id. at 717–18 n.4. 
 236. Of course, the majority still retained the ability to rescind, through a subsequent statewide 
vote, Amendment No. 7’s deviation from one person, one vote. The voting majority in Colorado 
clearly consented to a deviation from a principle of one person, one vote rule that would have 
expanded its voting influence, but it also retained democratic control through statewide direct 
democracy. Compare Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 759 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the popular majority in Colorado retained the power to reverse its decision by 
initiative), with McCloskey, supra note 168, at 71–72 (noting the absence of any provision for popular 
initiative in Baker v. Carr). 
 237. The Court’s decision in Lucas to strike down Amendment No. 7 and impose strict application 
of the one person, one vote doctrine, therefore, attempted to protect the majority from itself. The Court 
rejected the state’s claim that popular approval of Amendment No. 7 saved it from unconstitutionality. 
The Court explained that “‘[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, and property and other fundamental rights may 
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.’” Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736 
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). The majority, the Court 
reasoned, cannot assent to the infringement of constitutional rights. Approval by the majority thus 
holds no “constitutional significance.” Id. at 737.  
 Except, of course, it should, at least as applied to the constitutional rights of the majority rather 
than the minority. Constitutional rights typically guard against tyranny of the majority upon the 
minority. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 261, 262 (1991) (arguing the one person, one vote doctrine was intended to redress minority 
subjugation of the majority—the rotten boroughs problem); Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the 
Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1334 (2005) (“[O]ne person, 
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Admittedly, the democratic deliberation to be expected from direct 
democracy will fall short of the loftiest ideals.238 Democracy in action is 
always a messy process, and direct democracy even more so. It regularly 
fails to realize the grandest hopes of deliberative democrats and civic 
republicans. The public debate about Proposition 77 and Issue 4 was no 
different. However, direct democracy does not need to be perfect to 
constitute a valuable and legitimizing improvement over today’s 
redistricting process. A growing body of empirical research suggests that 
the use of direct democracy boosts civic engagement, voters’ sense of 
political efficacy, and voters’ general political knowledge.239 California 
and Ohio voters learned from the public debates about Proposition 77 and 
Issue 4, even if not as much as we would hope. The campaigning of 
political insiders and endorsements of public-interest groups collectively 
helped educate the electorate about the relevant choices, motivations, and 
tradeoffs to be faced in redistricting. As a result, direct democracy exposed 
redistricting to public oversight and forced political insiders to provide 
public-sounding justifications for those decisions. Indeed, the public 
debate over actual redistricting maps should motivate political elites much 
more so than Proposition 77 and Issue 4, and would be even more robust 
and engaging.  
C. Creative Use of Direct Democracy in Redistricting 
Successful use of direct democracy in redistricting reform depends on a 
robust political process to develop proposals from which the public can 
choose through a statewide vote. Direct democracy empowers voters when 
a competitive, vibrant political process provides a public forum for debate, 
compromise, and production of redistricting options. Development of 
redistricting proposals through the normal legislative process, for ultimate 
presentation to the voters, invites interested constituencies and political 
 
 
one vote—which is really a majoritarian principle dressed in individual rights rhetoric—doesn’t 
necessarily protect minorities against majority oppression.”). In Lucas, however, there was no rotten 
boroughs problem. Instead, the Court blocked the majority from voluntarily (but provisionally) ceding 
a degree of legislative power and imposed upon the residents of Colorado a political system that they 
did not want.  
 238. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Essay, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten 
Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 950 (2004) 
(lamenting the absence of a deliberative dialogue during the 2003 California recall election).  
 239. See generally DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE 
EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES (2004); Fredrick Boehmke, The Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size and Diversity of State 
Interest Group Populations, 64 J. POL. 827 (2002).  
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leaders to engage in the familiar process of legislative and political 
advocacy. The major parties would actively compete to develop a proposal 
that balances the needs of their wide-ranging coalitions and to win party-
wide support, while also producing a proposal that is publicly defensible 
and likely to win popular approval in a statewide vote. The process thus 
enables the parties to serve their traditional role as the central builders of 
coalitions around which American politics organize and revolve.240 The 
combination of party involvement and direct democracy encourages a 
political debate among elites in a competition for public approval that 
promises to educate and guide voters on redistricting.  
Current proposals for a “people’s assembly” to decide redistricting are 
promising in certain respects but limited in other important ways. 
Christopher Elmendorf and Heather Gerken advocate the use of an 
unelected popular body, drawn from the electorate at large, to deliberate 
and draft redistricting proposals.241 A people’s assembly avoids incumbent 
self-interest and produces an element of direct popular involvement. 
However, the popular involvement offered by a people’s assembly is quite 
circumscribed. Although involvement is profound for the hundred or so 
people chosen to participate in the assembly, popular involvement is 
almost completely absent for the rest of the electorate. Only the assembly 
participants have direct influence on the process. A people’s assembly thus 
blocks outside political access and accountability in similar ways to courts 
and independent commissions.  
Nonetheless, I do not claim that my proposal is the only method of 
successfully using direct democracy or popular involvement in 
redistricting. A people’s assembly can be used in tandem with, or parallel 
to, a legislative process to develop redistricting plans in ways outlined by 
Elmendorf and Gerken. Issue 4, though fatally troubled in several respects, 
also specified a process of public hearings before the proposed 
independent commission for collecting redistricting plans from the general 
public. Although Issue 4 contemplated an absurdly narrow focus on 
electoral competitiveness as the sole criterion for deciding among plans, 
public hearings as a venue for interested groups to offer redistricting 
proposals may be productive as a supplement to the legislative process or 
 
 
 240. See generally Kang, supra note 199 (describing the central importance of political parties in 
American politics).  
 241. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory 
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005); Gerken, supra note 5; see 
also Jim Sanders, New Bid to Carve Districts Survives, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 16, 2006, at A3 
(reporting on California legislative consideration of a proposal for a people’s assembly).  
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a people’s assembly. In other words, creative use of new institutional 
processes in redistricting is a good thing, provided it offers greater 
opportunities for political accessibility and accountability.  
In fact, creative use of direct democracy in redistricting could provide 
new tools to protect minority rights as well. Election results provide 
valuable information about the preferences of citizens across the 
jurisdiction and would generate precinct-level data on support for the 
various redistricting proposals. By examining the geographic distribution 
of support, the government can determine whether there was widespread 
or divided approval of a particular proposal. The winning ballot measures 
in Jones and Lucas, for instance, each received majority support in every 
county of their respective state.242 Geographic dispersion of support in 
these cases signaled wider consensus in favor of the approved proposals 
than usually identifiable by examining only the aggregate election totals. 
Indeed, jurisdictions may choose to require geographic dispersion of 
support as a condition of any proposal’s enactment, in effect requiring a 
form of supermajority to ensure consensus.  
Precinct-level data also provide a means by which the government and 
courts can gauge the preferences of affected minorities. Although direct 
democracy safeguards majority preferences,243 there is a risk that the 
electoral majority can tyrannize the minority and entrench its favored 
arrangements into law.244 By examining precinct-level results and 
registration data, the government and courts can determine whether 
affected minorities supported or opposed the enacted proposal. For 
instance, the government and courts can look to returns in precincts where 
affected minorities reside for reliable data on minority preferences. Actual 
voting data on the redistricting proposals offer credible, reliable, and 
legally cognizable evidence of minority preferences with respect to the 
various redistricting options on the table. The data provide a way to 
determine whether minority preferences are being overridden in direct 
democracy, or whether minority preferences align with the majority in 
support of whatever proposal wins out.  
Evidence of minority support for various redistricting proposals bears 
significant legal consequence. In cases like Ashcroft, where legal questions 
 
 
 242. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 731; Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (1997). 
 243. See generally JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).  
 244. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 434 (1998); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).  
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hinge on minority sentiment, courts and commentators have little reliable 
information about African-American community sentiment regarding the 
tradeoffs inherent in the Ashcroft redistricting. As in Ashcroft, courts and 
commentators may be quick to impute community support based on the 
reaction of its elected officials. But this is nothing more than a guess, 
perhaps an incorrect one if the nearly unanimous opposition of community 
and civil-rights groups is any guide. In the absence of direct democracy, 
the larger point is that we simply cannot know definitely one way or the 
other.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The future of redistricting reform depends on finding political 
solutions. Reform is currently headed in the wrong direction, in search of 
apolitical solutions to what is quintessentially a political problem. By 
trying to insulate redistricting from the political process, redistricting 
reform disempowers the democratic public from involvement and agency 
in deciding a fundamental question of democratic governance. The 
election defeats of Proposition 77 and Issue 4 helped reveal the troubles of 
this approach.  
The Article instead proposes the use of direct democracy as an 
institutional solution. Reform should democratize redistricting by directly 
involving the public in decisions about how lines should be redrawn. The 
main contribution of the Article is to re-focus redistricting reform on the 
importance of democratic decision through the political process and to 
begin the search for creative new ways to transform the political process of 
redistricting, rather than trying to hide from it.  
Direct democracy provides a means by which the community can 
express its wishes clearly and directly, with legal effect. Election results 
would reveal unmistakable public support for whatever tradeoffs are 
offered in various redistricting proposals. Everyone, including courts, 
could reliably assess voting by any affected minority to see whether it had 
accepted the tradeoffs inherent in any redistricting. Direct democracy 
provides the only mechanism by which voters themselves can take 
ownership of the value judgments and compromises built into the 
redistricting process. 
  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/4
